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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study examines how the Ottomans perceived the Russian revolution of 
1905. In order to achieve this, the Russian revolution of 1905 is described from the 
eyes of both parties pertaining to the Ottoman empire in 1905, namely the Young 
Turk revolutionaries, who were very active in 1905 in Europe and their main target, 
the Ottoman imperial government. This thesis is composed of three chapters. The 
first chapter provides the reader with a historical background to the Russian 
revolution of 1905 and to the Ottoman empire in 1905. Following this, the second 
chapter studies the Russian revolution of 1905 from Young Turks’ point of view by 
relying upon the Young Turk journals published in Europe and in Egypt during the 
subject revolutionary years. The third chapter, which is based on the archival 
documents, describes how the Ottoman imperial government regarded the Russian 
revolution of 1905.  
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ÖZET 
 
 Bu çalışma, 1905 Rus İhtilali’nin Osmanlılar tarafından nasıl algılandığını 
incelemektedir. Bunun için, 1905 yılında ihtilalci faaliyetlerde bulunan Jön 
Türkler’in ve bu faaliyetlerin hedefi olan Osmanlı hükümeti’nin 1905 Rus İhtilali’ne 
bakış açıları ele alınmış ve söz konusu ihtilalin bu iki karşıt grup tarafından nasıl 
görüldüğü ve anlaşıldığı anlatılmıştır. Üç bölümden oluşan bu tezin ilk bölümü, 
okuyucuya 1905 Rus İhtilali ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun 1905 yılındaki durumu 
ile ilgili bir tarihsel arka plan sağlamaktadır. İkinci bölüm, 1905 Rus İhtilalini, Jön 
Türk gazetelerine dayanarak, Jön Türkler’in bakış açısından ele almaktadır. Üçüncü 
bölümde ise, 1905 İhtilali’nin Osmanlı hükümeti tarafından nasıl algılandığını 
anlamak için, ihtilal ile ilgili bu dönemdeki resmi yazışmalar incelenmiştir.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Being two of the remaining traditional empires in the year of 1905, the 
Russian and the Ottoman empires had much in common and in contrast. The subject 
year came with a revolution in the Russian empire and the subject revolution was 
watched closely and in detail in the neighboring Ottoman empire, which would have 
its own, having different dynamics but same aims and ends, just three years later. 
Since the Russian revolution of 1905 took place in an spontaneous and unorganized 
way which then turned out to be a constitutional revolution; all these movements and 
demonstrations of the people that most of scholars interested in Russian history 
regard as a revolution today were at the beginning considered to be disorders 
(igtişaşât) stemming from discontent of the Russian people both in the Ottoman 
imperial correspondence and in the Ottoman revolutionary press.  
The Russian revolution of 1905, following constitutional revolution in Iran in 
1906 and news on government’s consideration of a constitutional regime in China 
were the harbingers of forthcoming constitutional struggles in the Ottoman empire, 
which had already experienced a constitutional regime in spite of its limitedness in 
scope and whose revolutionary dynamics that had strong roots both in thought and in 
activity strengthened their organization in Europe and throughout the empire and 
accelerated their activities. Therefore, the Russian revolution of 1905 was a unique 
example of a constitutional struggle, which emerged in the strongest autocracy of the 
world and from which lessons should have been taken both by the revolutionary 
activists and by the Hamidian government.  
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The Russian revolution of 1905 has been studied in detail from various 
perspectives by Soviet and Western scholars. The Soviet historians especially 
consider the revolution of 1905 as a way to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and 
studied the revolution in detail and produced many political and documentary books 
and articles about the revolution and its effects in the World. The Western historians 
also produced great works on the said revolution. Apart from chapters in 
Shipilkova’s, Pankrotova’s and  Ivar Spectors’s works, which in fact mention overall 
pictures of the effects and repercussions of the Russian revolution of 1905 in the 
Ottoman empire; there has been no study on the impact of the revolution of 1905 in 
the Ottoman empire, which uses Ottoman sources of the subject era. Uygur 
Kocabaşoğlu and Metin Berge’s book, which deals with the Bolshevik revolution 
and the Ottoman intelligentsia, is a cornerstone in such studies.  
Thus, the aim of the subject study is to create a framework for understanding 
how the Ottomans, who would experience a similar revolution in 1908, regarded a 
constitution revolution, taking place in the great neighbor Russia unexpectedly. In 
order to achieve this, one should consider both sides in the Ottoman empire, i.e., the 
Hamidian government and the Young Turk revolutionaries. Since the main means of 
spreading ideas for the revolutionaries was the press, the Ottoman revolutionary 
press in Europe and in Egypt, which contained news about the Russian revolution of 
1905, was studied. Moreover, in order to understand what the governing circles of 
Abdülhamid II perceived pertaining the revolution, the official documents of the 
Ottoman empire including reports of the St. Embassy, special reports of the Grand 
Vizier, translations made by the Chambers of Translation, documents regarding the 
foreign affairs and military and agreements signed between the Ottoman and Russian 
empires were examined. Thus, the thesis aims at providing the perception of a 
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constitutional revolution by both sides in the Ottoman empire through first-hand 
sources.  
The thesis is divided into three main parts following the introduction, the first 
chapter provides the reader with an historical background to the Revolution of 1905 
and the course of revolution and the position of the Ottoman empire in 1905 with 
regard to the Hamidian rule and government and the Young Turk revolutionaries. 
This chapter is mainly based on secondary English, Turkish and Russian sources.  
The second chapter explores how the Ottoman revolutionary journals 
published in Europe and in Egypt, where arms of the Sultan could not reach, 
regarded the Russian revolution of 1905. The subject chapter is based on the journals 
of Türk, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, Feryad, Osmanlı and İctihadsince these journals had the 
mainstream ideology of the Young Turk revolutionaries and circulated both in 
Europe and in the Ottoman empire among the intellectuals. The other revolutionary 
journals were either local, which did not have news in international scope or were 
ceased to be published at that time. In order to provide a clearer picture, this chapter 
is thematically divided into sub-sections.  
The third chapter shows how the Ottoman government perceived the 
revolutionary activities and the course of revolution and its aftermath in the Russian 
empire. This chapter mainly relies upon the Ottoman archival documents. The 
official Ottoman documents pertaining to the revolution of 1905 are found in Yıldız 
classification, which contains the documents gathered during the reign of 
Abdülhamid II, at Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in İstanbul. Since Abdülhamid 
II transformed the Palace, namely Yıldız Palace in which he lived, the center of the 
imperial administration and requested immediate information about the internal and 
external developments through his network of government officials and of agents, a 
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great amount of documents was kept in this classification. The said classification 
also covers special subjects that Abdülhamid II requested detailed information; 
various reports, petitions and notifications submitted to the Palace; documents of 
important figures including Kamil Paşa, Mithat Paşa, Cevdet Paşa; hand-written 
notebooks of Abdülhamid II and maps.  
As it is indicated in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi1, the classification 
reflects the important international political developments of the era including 
relations with Russia, Armenian problem, Crete events and Egypt. Documents 
constituting Yıldız classification are sub-divided into five groups in the archives: 
Yıldız Esas Evrakı, Sadaret Resmi Maruzat Evrakı, Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı, 
Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı, Yıldız Perakande Evrakı. As can be guessed, this 
classification contains countless documents of Abdülhamid II’s 33-year reign. 
Since documents regarding the Russian revolution of 1905 and its aftermath 
are included within the sub-group of Yıldız Perakende Evrakı (Y.PRK.), the subject 
sub-group and the documents included within this groups need to be mentioned. 
Most of the documents regarding the Russian revolution of 1905 in Yıldız 
classification are founded in Elçilik, Şehbenderlik ve Ateşemiliterlik (Y.PRK.EŞA.), 
which contains the correspondence between the Palace and the Ottoman Embassies, 
Şehbenderlik and Offices of Military Attaché in foreign countries. Apart from this, 
the subject catalog also includes the documents forwarded to the Palace by 
committees, companies and other institutions in foreign countries; documents 
forwarded by the undersecretaries, interpreters and charges d’affaires of the 
Ottoman embassies to the Başkitabet.  This catalog has the documents sent by the 
Ottoman Ambassador to the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Military Attaché in 
                                                 
1 Yusuf İhsan Genç (et. all), Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Rehberi (İstanbul : T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet 
Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2000), pp.  361-372. 
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1905 and in 1905. These documents, as can be guessed, provided the Sultan with 
very detailed information about the revolution going on in the Russian empire.  
Apart from this, another important catalog within the subject sub-group is 
Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiyye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği (Y.PRK.TKM), which covers the 
petitions and denouncements written in a foreign language and forwarded to the 
Sultan; translations of the documents of organizations established by foreigners; 
petitions of foreigners and balance sheets, manifestations of foreign companies; 
other translated documents without signatures, published documents in foreign 
languages and their translations. Hariciye Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.HR.) is also 
included within the sub-group of Yıldız Perakende Evrakı. This catalog contains the 
correspondence and documents forwarded between the Palace and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and its offices. The catalog includes the official messages with the 
signature of the Minister of Foreign Affairs; translations of letters and other 
documents sent by governors or officials of foreign countries; translations of 
quotations from foreign newspapers with the letterhead of the ministry; documents 
submitted by the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; documents 
forwarded by Directorate of Foreign Press.  
Askeri Maruzat (Y.PRK.ASK) is another catalog within the subject sub-
group. This catalog covers the documents forwarded to the Palace by Ministry of 
War, Ministry of Navy and other offices related with the military. The last catalog of 
Yıldız Perakende is Mabeyn Başkitabeti (Y.PRK.BŞK), which contains the copies of 
the telegrams dispatched to the governors, commanders, ambassadors, inspectors 
and ministers in the capital; copies of decrees written by the Head Clerk; documents 
submitted by the Head Clerk to the Sultan.  
 6 
Apart from these catalogs, since it contains the informative letters submitted 
by the office of the Grand Vizier to the Sultan about domestic and international 
affairs and policies followed; the Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı (Y.A.HUS.), 
which especially focuses on the foreign affairs, is also used in this chapter. The 
subject catalog contains documents in form of informative letters about Eastern 
Rumeli, Armenian issues, Crete problem, Egypt issue, African issues and relations of 
foreign countries with the Ottoman empire.2 
In the period covered by the subject study, the Julian calendar was used in the 
Russian empire. In the 20th century, the Julian calendar was thirteen days behind the 
Gregorian calendar that has been used in the West. Thus, the dates in Julian calendar 
in the first chapter’s parts pertaining to the revolution of 1905 in Russia are 
preserved; yet the dates of Ottoman revolutionary journals and Ottoman official 
documents in the second and third chapter are given in accordance with the 
Gregorian calendar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Ibid., pp. 361-372. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
  
 
1.1.The Double-Headed Eagle Trapped 
 
          Russia entered the twentieth century with the revolution of 1905, which would 
immediately be felt in Iran, the Ottoman Empire, China and India. The Russian 
revolution of 1905 came into existence and developed as a spontaneous, unplanned 
and unorganized chain of events, which, step by step, led the country to a 
constitutional structure. It can be argued with confidence that the revolution of 1905 
marked a turning point in the imperial Russian history and had long-lasting effects 
both for Russians and for neighboring nations that formed a constitutional 
revolutionary circle shortly after the Russian experience. As Teodor Shanin states 
Russian Empire started a new century with a revolution and “for the rest of the world 
a new century began with the Russian revolution of 1905”3. In fact, revolutionary 
movements of 1848 in the 19th century transformed into the constitutional 
revolutions in the 20th century in various parts of the World, specifically in Eurasian 
multi-ethnic empires. Thus, the constitutional revolution of 1905 in Russia, of 1906 
in Iran, of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire and of 1911 in China took place with the 
same demands to the rulers. Even, one can add these revolutionary movements of 
India in the period of 1905-1908 and of Indonesia in 19094.  The core of the 
argument here is the fact that although all these countries, in which constitutional 
revolutionary movements came into existence, had different social structures and 
                                                 
3 Teodor Shanin, Russia, 1905-07: Revolution as a Moment of Truth (Houndmills: Macmillan , 1986), 
p.1. 
4 Ibid., p.1. 
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different governing traditions; they all experienced similar upheavals and disorders5 
with indeed varying results. Whether it was a “world time” for that region, or 
spontaneous, but self-completing circle of revolutions6, there are similar patterns of 
development in these constitutionalist revolutionary movements.  
Before delving into the topic, however, it is going to be useful to remember 
and to understand the underlying reasons, development and termination of the 
Russian revolution of 1905 in a broader perspective. As it has been pointed out 
above, the Russian revolution came into existence and developed throughout the 
empire as a spontaneous, unplanned and unorganized movement. As known, all such 
movements must have a long lasting background to take place, especially in a 
country with strict Orthodox tradition and centuries old autocracy.   
1.1.1. Background to the Russian revolution of 1905 
   In spite of the fact that the events that occurred at the beginning of the 20th 
century and transformed Russia into a revolutionary upheaval can be considered as a 
part of the events including massive strikes, peasants disorders, struggles for 
parliamentary suffrage, armed mutinies that were taking place in Europe7; the 
Russian case turned out to be a constitutional revolution in which nearly all classes 
of the Russian society united against the autocracy; and ended with establishment of 
a Duma that challenged with the supreme autocracy of the tsar that had been granted 
by God.  
The term revolution is generally considered as a leap in social structure, 
which integrates fundamental systems of domination, property relations and class 
                                                 
5 Nader Sohrabi, “Historicising Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran 
and Russia 1905-1908”, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 100, No. 6 (May, 1995), p.1384. 
6 Fernard Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp.25-50. 
7 Norman Stone, Europe Transformed 1878 – 1919  (Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 
1999), Part II. 
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divisions.8 It may also lead to a transformation of the state apparatus with newly 
consolidated state organizations following the transformation of the socio-economic 
structure, removal of its rulers9, and promotion of further change. Moreover, 
revolutions proceed through struggles participated by organized political parties, 
organized or unorganized social elements including intellectuals, workers, peasants 
and professionals10. Furthermore, as Sohrabi stresses, constitutional revolutions and 
methods of constitutional revolutionaries have should be differentiated from each 
other. Namely, constitutionalists did not struggle for an immediate and complete 
overthrow of the state apparatus of the old regime, but instead they demanded an 
elective representative body through which they would participate directly or 
indirectly in the legislative process11. The next step for them was to carry out gradual 
reforms and take control of the executive by legislative power12.  
Indeed, a revolutionary situation necessitates certain conditions, which 
include a major social crisis caused by wars or economic depressions; rapid 
crystallization of social classes and other conflict groups; rise of organizations and 
ideologies behinds these organizations; a crisis of governing elite and state apparatus; 
a linked moral crisis; and lastly a proper international arena13.  As it can be easily 
seen, all these conditions had already been existed in Russia in 1905. To add more, 
when we take the forced change in the Russian monarchy’s autocratic rule, the “dress 
rehearsal” can be considered as a revolution, in contrary to what Alan Wood tells 
about 1905 in a way that “1905 was not a revolution in the proper meaning of the 
term” since the strike movements, demonstrations, disorders and mutinies “which 
                                                 
8 Shanin, Russia...., p. 7. 
9 Ibid., p.7. 
10 Theda Skocpol, “State and Revolution: Old Regimes and Revolutionary Crises in France, Russia 
and China”, Theory and Society, Vol. 7, No. 1/2, Special Double Issue on State and Revolution (Jan. - 
Mar., 1979) ,p.7. 
11 Sohrabi, “Historicising..., p.1385. 
12 Ibid., p. 1385. 
13 Shanin, Russia...., pp.7-8. 
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swept across Russia in 1905 left most of her social, political and economic 
institutions intact”14.  
Wood obviously perceives the chain of events with a micro based approach 
as a road to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, however, he misses the theoretical 
bases of the revolution of 1905, which took place as a constitutional revolution rather 
than a post-constitutional revolution, which generally aims at a complete overthrow 
of the old regime and its state apparatus, in the Russian case, it was the February 
revolution by which the Tsarist Russia was exterminated. When we consider the road 
to the Bolshevik revolution that can be traced back to the social discontent in the 19th 
century and to the industrial boom of 1890s; “the chain reaction of explosions that 
shook the Tsarist regime to its foundations”15 in 1905 is easily seen as a breaking 
point. Furthermore, the revolution should not be regarded as an event that made any 
one part of the development inevitable, but rather as a critical juncture that opened up 
several parts16. Then, what made the Russian case end in a revolution lies on the 
background of these events that can be dated back to the 19th century reforms and 
their results. Another point that Wood misses is the fact that the revolutionaries of 
1905 failed to reach all of their demands. As it will be explained later, the old 
regime’s state apparatus was able to keep most of its structure intact except for a few, 
but not efficient changes including a Duma. Yet, as Shanin, who classifies the 
revolution of 1905 as a revolution from above, points out, in revolutions which fail, 
the long term social transformation triggered off by such a defeat of social forces is 
often very substantial17 like complete overthrow of the monarchy in 1917.   
                                                 
14 Alan Wood, “Russia-1905: Dress Rehearsal for Revolution”, History Today, vol. 31, Issue 8 
(August, 1981), p. 28. 
15 Ibid., p. 29. 
16 Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, Russia in Disarray (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), p.2. 
17 Shanin, Russia..., p.7. 
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Reforms from above were an inevitable policy of the traditional empires after 
manifestation of their backwardness was declared in various events and in their 
relations with politically advanced European countries. Also, to carry out the reforms 
from above prevented the revolution from below at the beginning of the social 
conflicts, so they made reforms to end the social discontent led by the conditions, 
which could create instability and threaten the status quo of the ruling elite. 
However, the reforms from above require reinforcement from below in order to be 
successful to reach their aims18.  
The first time that the tsarist state seriously considered the Russian people 
was the era following the French revolution and the Decembrists revolt. These 
troubles demonstrated that perhaps in the future the narod politically would be able 
to play a role and the masses should have been told what to do. The state formulated 
a national doctrine as the vague formula "Orthodoxy-Autocracy-Nationality" 
(Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost'), which would also be adopted by Nicholas 
II, in response to "liberté, egalité, fraternité" of the French Revolution. Indeed, the 
French Revolution and the Decembrists revolt did not bring about great reforms or 
important changes in the Russian imperial structure. 
At that point, when we look at the reforms of Alexander II, its effects on the 
forthcoming social structure and social conflicts deserve a special attention. 
Alexander II was known as the Tsar Liberator, and as many historians and 
contemporaries are aware of the fact that he in fact was trying to get rid of the social 
discontent aroused especially among the peasants and thus to secure his throne. 
During his reign, Count Loris-Mellikov was made dictator of Russia and a 
                                                 
18 Terence Emmons, “Revolution from Above in Russia: Reflections on Natan Eidel’man’s Last Book 
and Related Matters”, Reform in Modern Russian History, ed. by Teodore Taranovski (New York: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 33. 
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constitution even was drafted and signed to be promulgated. However, as known the 
constitution was blown up by a bomb that killed Alexander II.  
With the assassination of the Tsar Liberator, Alexander II, the great reforms 
and future plans ceased to be carried out, which brought about incomplete series of 
reforms from above. In spite of this, a very important leap in reformation had been 
provided and various important reforms had been granted to the people. Yet, both the 
missing parts of the Emancipation Act of 1861 that were “land and liberty” for the 
peasants and the immediate reactionary policies of Alexander III, who was enthroned 
after his father’s assassination, led to the quiet continuation of social discontent and 
gradually to an intense pressure from below. The subject intense pressure from below 
had indeed stemmed from the peasants and their narodnik revolutionaries until a new 
force, whose foundations had been laid by the industrial boom of 1890s, would be 
added to them in the revolutionary struggle of 1905, i.e. workers.  
 Therefore, one can say that before the year of 1905, the gulf between ruled 
(nizy) and ruling (verkhi) in the Russian empire has began to widen in the early 19th 
century with the growing social discontent that had its roots in the late 18th century 
when a group of men educated in Western style started to see the ruling class and 
bureaucracy as the main obstacle beyond the developmental progress of the Russian 
people19, which was also the beginning phase of Miliukov’s “two Russias”. 
However, one obvious fact which should not be ignored or neglected is that the 
Russian people, especially the main bulk of them, the peasant, during these centuries 
or even during the revolution of 1905 never broke with the idea of tsarism. They 
continued to perceive the Tsar as a divine figure and demonstrated their loyalty to 
him on certain occasions; when, for example, tsar visited Moscow or traveled to a 
                                                 
19 Sidney Harcave, First Blood: The Russian Revolution of 1905 (London: The Bodley Head, 1964), p. 
26. 
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part of the country, huge crowds of people gathered and showed their devotion to 
him, as it was the case in canonization of Serafim of Sarov in 1903. Yet, it is also 
evident that the people had had certain hatred against bureaucracy and governmental 
officials, which slowly but decisively urged the fire of antipathy towards existing 
authority among the peasants, at a faster rate among the intelligentsia and workers 
and among some of the national minorities20.  
 Before and during the process of the revolution of 1905 in the Russian 
empire, the problems that the Tsarist government faced varied and in fact showed the 
extent of the revolutionary upheavals. There are in fact five basic issues that the 
tsarist government had to deal with; these were agrarian, labor, nationality, 
intelligentsia, and university questions21.  
1.1.2. Foundations shaken: the Revolution of 1905 
In line with the theory of constitutional revolutions that is formulated by 
Sohrabi, the constitutional revolutionary movements, which aim at creating 
legislative assemblies, do not intend to overthrow the whole old-regime suddenly. 
Their struggle and the old-regime’s response follow a similar pattern of development 
in all constitutional revolutions. When the revolutionary forces prove to the 
government that they can pose a real threat to the existing system, the government 
agrees to their demands, i.e. a legislative assembly. As long as, most of the demands 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p.28. 
21 See, O.G. Bukhovets, “Political Consciousness of the Russian Peasantry in the Revolution of 1905-
1907”, Russian Review, Volume 47, Issue 4 (October, 1988); S. Stepniak, The Russian Peasantry 
(London : S. Sonnenschein & co., 1905);  Geoffrey Hosking, Russia, People and Empire 1552-1917 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997); G.M. Hamburg, “The Russian Nobility 
on the Eve of the 1905 Revolution”, Russian Review, Volume 38, Issue 3 (January, 1979); Oscar 
Anweiler, The Soviets: The Russian Workers, Peasants and Soldier Councils, 1905-1921 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1974); Sergei Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, trans. And edited by Abraham 
Yarmolinsky, (Garden City, N.Y., Toronto: Double Day, Page, 192) for agricultural and labor 
problems; and see Akdes Nimet Kurat, Rusya Tarihi: Başlangıçtan 1917’ye Kadar (Ankara: TTK, 
1948); Hosking, Russia, People...;  Harcave, First Blood... for industrial problem; and see Vladimir C. 
Nahirny, The Russian Intelligentsia. From Torment to Silence (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 
1983); Petr Struve, “The Intelligentsia and Revolution”, Vekhi, translated and edited by Marshall S. 
Shatz and Judith E. Zimmerman, (New York: M.E. Sharp, 1994); Ascher, The Revolution..., for 
intelligentsia and university problems. 
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of the revolutionaries are accepted by the government of the old regime, a period in 
which both extralegal and legal in contrast to the former period begins22.  
In the second stage, both parties, namely the government and the 
revolutionary groups, try to reinforce its strength and to establish power blocks. 
Another important fight embedded in this stage is the support of quasi-governmental 
institutions23. However, as it was the case in the Russian experience of 1905, the 
revolutionary groups tend to demand more as they are given concessions by the 
government. At that point, the government that is generally still effective and 
powerful enough takes initiatives and starts a counter-revolution with the support of 
the social groups negatively affected by the revolutionary movement. Then, another 
struggle in which constitutionalists carry out illegal methods with illegal resources 
emerges24.  
The counter-revolutionary third stage of the constitutional revolutions 
determines the fate of the revolution and scope of the major demands of the 
revolutionaries. If revolutionaries are defeated by the government in the third stage, 
then the revolution fails to reach the fourth stage in which “state building legality” 
are to be defined by them25.  
When we look at the Russian Empire before and during the revolution of 
1905, we can set the scene for a constitutional revolution with the help of the said 
theories of revolutionary situation by Teodor Shanin and of constitutional revolution 
by Nader Sohrabi. As can be remembered, there are certain requirement posed by 
Teodor Shanin for a revolutionary situation, which were, in summary, an economic 
or social crises, crystallization of social classes, rise of legal and illegal organizations 
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and ideologies, a crisis of the governing elites, a moral crisis, and a convenient 
international arena26.  
As for Russia, it can be said that the economic and social crises, as we have 
already mentioned above, in the Russian Empire at the turn of the century were so 
explicit. With a proper international background, the empire was in a financial and 
economic crisis that was caused both by internal situation following the industrial 
boom and by the European economic crisis at the end of the 19th century27. 
Moreover, the outbreak of war with Japan in 1904 widened the ongoing economic 
crisis and put an end to the slight recovery experienced at the end of 1903 and at the 
beginning of 1904. Also, the agrarian question was still there with hungry peasants 
and bankrupting nobles, and a booming, yet threatening industry, which added the 
existing and growing economic crisis a social dimension.     
Another obvious development on the eve of the revolution in the Russian 
empire was marked by a highly fragmented society28 in which each social class 
started to obtain a certain consciousness that would further itself towards political 
consciousness during the revolutionary stages. It is known that the workers began to 
be organized in last decade of the 19th century and gradually transformed their 
organizations into politically-oriented bodies on the road to the revolution of 1905. 
Moreover, peasant organizations came into being during the revolution. Liberal 
middle-class and gentry organizations were also there at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Seemingly, certain class consciousness and organizations were the rising 
trends in the Russian empire.  
In terms of the criteria regarding a crisis of the governing elite, first of all it 
should be said that Tsar Nicholas II was a relatively weak character compared with 
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predecessors and easily affected by his ministers and generals, which caused an 
unconformity among the governing elites in his reign29. Furthermore, the 
bureaucratic machine, which created hatred in some parts of the empire among the 
people, should be taken into account as a part of the crisis in the governing strata.  
The Japanese war and the European economic crises enabled the rapid 
realization of the revolutionary path in the Russian empire. These two events also fit 
into the criteria envisaging an appropriate international arena for the revolutionary 
situation. In addition to this, the defeats that the Russians had at the hands of the 
Japanese led to a moral crisis both among the members of the government and 
among the people, who at the beginning of the war had united as a whole including 
the students, most of the intelligentsia, workers and peasants.  Therefore, as it can be 
understood all the criteria, which are necessary for a revolutionary situation, existed 
in the Russian empire at the beginning of the 20th century.   
Another depressing element was the Japanese war, for which Kuropatkin 
said, “we need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution”30. The Japanese, 
who had been marked as an easy prey and victory over whom had been considered as 
a matter of time, proved to be victorious day by day, however. Indeed, the Japanese 
war did not make a revolution, as Ascher says; yet it helped opposition create proper 
conditions for such a movement in the Russian empire31.  
 While the war in the Far East was continuing to be a source of bad news for 
the empire, the domestic situation became fatal in the first month of 1905, when the 
zemtvos, municipal dumas, worker unions, liberalist unions intensified their pressure 
over the government and their agitation over the people. There were in fact three 
principal issues that motivated the opponents to the regime these were constitutional 
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struggle, struggle of the labor and struggle of the peasantry. Every social group that 
involved in the opposition were to a great extent distinct groups, yet each of them 
had a cause to be in the opposition and each of them stressed one of the above-
mentioned issues in their struggles32.  
Thus, the turn of the century witnessed several violent signs of the coming 
revolution. The governing elites with a shock experienced the assassination of 
Sipyagin, Minister of Interior in 1903, of Plehve on July 15, 1904 by a bomb. 
Moreover, growing intensity and politicization of the worker strikes and 
organizations and of peasant uprisings provided easy clues for the government 
officials to take precautions.  
Actually appointment of Prince Peter Svyatopolk-Mirsky to the post of the 
Ministry of Interior can be considered as a change in imperial policy since 
Svyatopolk-Mirsky was known as a liberal-minded man and his appointment was 
regarded by many people in the empire as the “beginning of a political spring” 
(vesna nadezhd i ozhidanii)33. He, during his first weeks in the office, did not 
disappoint those who had thought that he would pursue liberal, at least not repressive 
policies. He firstly removed Plehve’s officials from their posts and took certain steps 
towards a reform-oriented policy like ending the policy of harassment of the 
zemstvos. Even, the conservative newspaper, Novoye Vremya stressed that the new 
minister might have been a bridge for a rapprochement between the government and 
people34.  However, it was not that easy. Svyatopolk-Mirsky’s proposal for reforms 
was discussed in a meeting conveyed by the Tsar. The most debated issue in his 
proposal focused on whether representatives elected by people should be allowed to 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 40. 
33 Bokhanov, A.N. (et. al), Istoria Rossii XX vek (Moscow: AST, 1997), p. 27. 
34 Harcave, First Blood..., p. 49. 
 18 
participate in the legislative or not35. The result came out to be that representatives 
were to be accepted in the legislative. However, as expected, the Tsar changed this 
final version of the proposal in a way that the representatives were not to be elected 
by people, but by the government36.  In fact, as Mirsky stressed in his Dairy, 
Nicholas II, having a passive and indecisive personality, at the beginning agreed with 
Mirsky that reforms were necessary, but was not sure about the means of affecting 
them37. Then, the Decree of December 12 including the reforms planned and to be 
considered was issued, yet it did not prove to be effective.  
What really became a catalyst of the Russian people and opened the violent 
phase of the revolution of 1905 was the “Bloody Sunday”. In 1903, when Zubatov’s 
“police socialism” was backfired and Zubatov was dismissed from the office, Father 
George Gapon, son of a Ukrainian peasant, began to organize Assemblies of the 
Workers of St. Petersburg with the approval and support of the police. In attempting 
such an activity, Father Gapon held the idea that the Orthodox Church should 
embrace the workers in order to avert the violent upheaval that their condition 
seemed likely to produce or “the pastor would remain without a flock”38. As known 
there are two basic allegations attributed to Father Gapon. To illustrate, Vice 
Minister of Interior argued that Gapon was an ally of the Social Democrats and 
Social Revolutionists and his real purpose was to make workers hostile to the Tsar. 
The other side of the argument claims that Gapon was a police agent receiving a 
certain amount of salary39. Yet, as Michael Florinsky points out, the documentary 
evidence shows that although he received subsidies and consulted to the police 
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officials, he was not an ordinary police agent and his aim was to counteract 
revolutionary agitations and to organize loyal working elements40.   
Membership of the Assembly, in which the strongest organization was 
established in Putilov Arms Factory with 13, 000 workers, grew rapidly. The web of 
events that would lead the revolutionary movement to the violent phase within the 
first stage of Sohrabi’s theory began when in December, 1904 four workers, 
members of Gapon’s Assembly (Sobraniye) were fired from Putilov Factories. 
Following, upon the announcement of the plant manager S. I. Smirnov that he did not 
consider the Assembly of St. Petersburg workers authorized to negotiate with him41, 
the sympathetic strikes whose aim was reinstatement of the four workers spread from 
plant to plant. Thus, the period known as Gaponovshchina began. In the following 
days, as the strikes spread to more plants, list of the demands became longer 
including even provocatively political issues like constituent assembly.  
During the same week from January 2 to January 9, Gapon laid the plans of a 
peaceful march to the Winter Palace in order to submit a petition to the Tsar who 
according to Gapon was under the influence of the organized upper-classes and who 
would embrace his people if he could be reached. Their petition demanded a 
constituent assembly, free universal education, civil rights, regulation of capital-
worker relations and an eight-hour working day with an increase in salaries. At the 
end, a peaceful march was planned to be realized on January 9, 1905 to the Winter 
Palace. The Assembly’s members agreed in the declaration that if the Tsar did not 
order his officials to carry out demands of the workers, they were ready to die before 
the Tsar’s eyes42. In fact, most of them were aware of the fact that some kind of 
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confrontation might have occurred; yet they did not believe that the troops would 
dare to fire.  
On January 9, 1905, huge number of workers of the Assembly carrying holy 
icons, Tsar’s portraits started their march from different directions to the Winter 
Palace in an orderly way. In a cold and gray St. Petersburg morning, the unexpected 
happened. Troops and police forces fired on the unarmed people including women 
and children. The fire killed 130 people officially and wounded several hundred43. 
However, the unofficial number of the disastrous event can reach three thousand as 
an English newspaper called Daily Mail estimated44.  Repercussions of the “Bloody 
Sunday” (krovavoe voskresen’e) shocked not only the Russian people, but also the 
World.  
In fact, as many of the scholars of Russian history would agree, the “Bloody 
Sunday” united the people against the Tsar, which political parties had not been able 
to achieve for years45. The weeks following the “Bloody Sunday” became scenes of 
mass protests in which every strata of the Russian society including both 
revolutionaries and constitutionalists acted homogeneously. The protest movements 
were also accompanied by an “epidemic of strikes”46 as a means of workers’ protest 
of the “Bloody Sunday”. Thus, during the first weeks following the disastrous event, 
the number of the workers on strikes rose to more than half-a-million in the industrial 
centers of the Russian empire47. Now, all the Russian population workers, 
professionals, local politicians and many other found themselves united in a firm 
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front against the autocracy48. Nicholas II’s reaction was illustrating at that point. 
What he wrote in his diary on January 9, 1905 is as follows49:  
“A grim day! As a result of the desire of the workers to go to 
the Winter Palace, serious disorders took place in Petersburg. 
In many parts of the city troops were compelled to fire; many 
were killed or wounded. God, how sad and grim!”  
  
Nicholas II was blamed and have still be blamed by some scholars of the field 
regarding the causes of the “Bloody Sunday”, which, however, seems unfair since 
the Tsar, probably, might not be informed about the march. If he had been informed 
properly by his officials, the end may have been different, because as far as we can 
infer from the studies on Nicholas II, one can say that he would have appear to the 
marchers carrying holy icons and his portraits, which was a sign of their loyalty. 
However, the government failed to carry out a well-planned and stable policy against 
the upheavals. One of the first actions of Nicholas II was to replace Svyatopolk-
Mirsky with Alexander Bulygin, who was a conservative nobleman, on January 15, 
1905. Moreover, he appointed General F. Trepov as the Governor-General of St. 
Petersburg and Assistant Minister of Interior, upon whose advise the Tsar accepted to 
receive a very carefully chosen group of workers on January 19, 1905 at Tsarkoye 
Selo. In this meeting, the Tsar read a statement, which covered nothing new for the 
workers and tried to mitigate the effects of “Bloody Sunday”.  
Yet, this subject symbolic act of the Tsar produced nothing, strikes continued 
and spread, protests became harsher and worst of all, for the Tsar, all these 
movements were carried out by the whole strata of his people. Now, the revolution 
was grasped by all classes of the Russian society. The month of February began with 
a depressing event for the Tsar. His uncle and a member of imperial family, Grand 
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Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, was assassinated. It was a great grief for the imperial 
family and for Nicholas II, for whom this event meant so much50.  
On one of the preceding days to the Decree of February 18, a conversation 
between the Tsar and Bulygin is very didactic. When Bulygin seemed stressed, 
Nicholas II said, “One would think that you are afraid a revolution will break out”; 
and Bulygin answered, “Your Majesty, a revolution has already begun”51. On 
February 18, Bulygin announced that the Tsar intended to summon the elected 
representatives of people as participants of the legislative process as a consultative 
assembly52. However, the announcement met with little response, and liberals and 
revolutionaries had already started to demand more, i.e. a constituent assembly with 
a universal suffrage and right to legislate and to draft a constitution53. Moreover, 
repressive activities were continued by the government officials following the 
subject Decree, which to some extent showed the untrustworthiness of the 
government in the eyes of the opposition groups54. Yet, an important result of the 
February Decree was the peasant petition campaign began in response to the Decree, 
which openly showed the level of politicization of the peasantry, allegedly the Tsar’s 
most loyal subjects55.   
Organizations of social classes had already been adopted the same principle 
of constituent assembly with the mentioned rights. The Union of Liberation and the 
Union of Unions, composed of fourteen separate professional unions under the 
chairmanship of P. Miliukov; the Peasants’ Union that was organized in July as a 
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part of peasants’ politicization; and the Zemstvo leaders met in July adopted all 
similar programs aiming at the same goals56. Meanwhile, the industrial, political 
upheavals began to spread to the villages and to the army, which were known to be 
dangerous for the Russian monarchy that was based on the loyalty of the army and 
peasantry. However, in May a moderate air was in the rural areas, while workers in 
the city continued and intensified their struggle.  
The fatal situation became worse with the news of defeat of the Russian army 
by the Japanese at Mukden in February and at Thushima on May 14-15. Following 
that, agrarian disturbances again intensified throughout the country. Now, the 
military prowess of the Russian empire, which was crucial to autocracy, was in the 
question. At that time, the defeat was clearer, which deepened the crisis both among 
the ruling elite and among the people.  However, it should be said that the Japanese 
war did not make the revolution inevitable, but it did facilitate and ease the 
revolutionary movement. Moreover, there are several arguments about the Japanese 
involvement in the revolution by providing the revolutionaries with funds and arms 
and helping revolutionary organizations57.  
Most importantly, the disaffection spread to the army, the stronghold of the 
tsarist power. The battleship of Potyomkin belonging to the Black Sea fleet of the 
Russian navy mutinied and arrested or killed their officers on June 14, 1905 and 
brought the ship with a red flag to Odessa where a general strike and bloody street 
battles were going on. At first, certain sections of the Black Sea fleet refused to obey 
the orders to have the ship attacked and sunk58, yet in a short while the state 
machinery run and the mutiny was contained. Mutineers surrendered the ship to the 
Rumanian port of Constanza. The military mutinies came into existence several 
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times during the revolution of 1905 at Sebastopol, Kronstadt and along the Trans-
Siberian railway, however, the bulk of the army still remained loyal to the Tsar and 
his government. Moreover, generally the army mutinies emerged not because of 
political demands; the army was not adequately politicized to be a part of the 
revolution in 1905. Yet, they were enough to lead to an apprehension in the 
government and a hope in the opposition.  
The last attempt of the leaders of an important sector of the opposition for 
reforms from above by appealing to the Tsar came on June 6, 1905 when under the 
presidency of Prince Sergei Trubetskoi a delegation including such names as Dimitri 
Shipov, Ivan Petrunkevich, Prince George Lvov and Count Peter Heyden was 
received by Nicholas II at Peterhof.  The main theme of the address that Trubetskoi 
read was that the country now was on the edge of a chasm by irresponsible actions of 
the bureaucrats, which brought about a disastrous war an a dangerous internal strife; 
and the only way of its recovery was through realization of the promised assembly 
and peace59. Although, the Tsar was very attentive and said that he would call for a 
Duma, the following weeks brought nothing like that. Therefore, “the duplicity and 
inflexibility of the Tsar” became a turning point for the appealing part of the 
opposition to turn to more radical elements. 
Following that, the only civilian form of support for Tsar and the government 
came from the Black Hundreds, which was a ultra-nationalistic movement involved 
in anti-Jewish pogroms and beating up leftist intelligentsia and student mostly. The 
Black Hundreds had two points in their struggle: fighting against opposition to the 
groups that attacked on the monarchy in time of a war and to minority groups which, 
as they thought, had an anti-Russian and anti-governmental feelings60. The Tsar and 
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his son would be the honorary member of the anti-Semitic Union of the Russian 
People (Soyuz Russkogo Naroda) to be founded in October 190561.  
At a time until when the Russian mentality had already undergone a change 
in a way that now “being against the government was an act of conformity than that 
of daring”62; the Tsar promulgated long-awaited law establishing a state Duma and 
defining the procedure and details of the elections on August 6, 1905 as promised in 
February Decree. However, the program, known as Bulygin plan, brought about new 
questions rather than peace at home or hopes because it envisaged a consultative 
assembly and a strange franchise system based on loyal peasantry, especially land 
owning nobles63. Witte also points out the same weak points of the Bulygin plan in 
his memoirs: the Duma would be a permanently functioning institution; all laws must 
have been discussed in the Duma; the Duma was an exclusively a consultative body; 
and the electoral law was based on the peasantry with regional restrictions64. Thus, as 
Witte, in his memoirs, says that the Decree was nothing more than a meaningless and 
empty gesture and it satisfied no one65. 
Interestingly, the Bulygin program became a point on which both 
conservatives and liberals and revolutionists agreed that it was unacceptable. As for, 
the conservatives the plan was a great concession and as for the liberals and 
revolutionists it was not satisfactory66. The iron grips of the revolution, namely the 
universities, were blessed by a surprise law of August 27 with restoration of their 
autonomy, which had been abolished in 1890s. The subject law turned the 
universities into police-free areas of illegal mass meetings, free speech. 
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Revolutionary leaders addressed long lasting speeches to the students, workers and 
other professionals. Students educated unconscious, but disaffected workers, artisans, 
tradesmen, peasants, and even housewives in the lecture halls where they should 
have been educated by professors. Thus, the universities played a very significant 
role at that stage, as G.S. Khrustalev Nosar said the St. Petersburg Soviet of 
Workers’ Deputies was a product of university autonomy67 and even carried out its 
first meeting in the University of St. Petersburg on October 12.  
Meanwhile, a peace treaty was signed with Japan at Portsmouth with fairly 
advantageous provisions for the Russian empire on August 23, which enabled the 
government to bring the troops from the Far East to the European provinces of the 
empire where the unrest and disorder flourished.  The chaotic situation that the 
Russian empire was going through gradually turned into a general strike, which by 
October 5 seemed very serious upheaval and which with the Railway Union’s 
decision of strike on October 7 grew and spread to every little aspect of the empire’s 
machinery including telegram and telephone services, industrial sector, printing 
sector and even pharmacies with a chain of solidarity throughout the country. In fact, 
as Ascher states, the general strike of October was “a classic example of a 
momentous historical event that developed spontaneously”68. It was the time when 
the political tension reached the peak point among the people.  
Out of this grave situation, an important organization emerged. It was the 
Soviet of Workers’ Deputies, which would play the decisive role in the history of the 
Russian empire. Immediately after its foundation, the Union of Unions and other left-
wing groups were overshadowed by it and they regarded the Soviet’s natural 
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leadership69. The Soviet of Workers’ Deputies convened on October 12 and their 
publication known as Izvestia appeared on October 17, when the Tsar reluctantly 
signed the October Manifesto granting basic freedoms and transforming the 
autocracy into a constitutional monarchy.  
However, it was not that easy for Nicholas II, who deeply believed in the 
traditional autocratic rule of the Russian empire and Nicholas I formula of 
“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality”, to sign such a manifesto that would be a great 
threat for the future of the monarchy and that would literarily put an end to the 
autocratic powers of the throne. As he writes in his memoirs, Witte, who was in fact 
a sincere favorer of the autocracy70, yet also held the idea that the autocracy should 
have been the revolutionary from above71 as the life became more complex and the 
autocratic regimes could no longer satisfy the national interest72, proposed two 
alternatives in order to save the future of the throne and the empire: suppression of 
all elements of the opposition and strikers by force that would be carried out by a 
dictator to be installed; or granting of a constituent assembly and a constitution73. 
Witte also told to the Tsar that he sided with the second choice and could be the 
Premier of a united ministerial board under a constitutional regime if ordered74. 
Meanwhile, Trepov as the Governor-General of St. Petersburg and Assistant Minister 
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of Interior, ordered to the troops “not to spare ammunition in the suppression of 
mutiny” and tried to tighten the control75, for which it was too late, in fact.  
After Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich begged his indemnity from serving 
as a dictator to pacify the empire and after Witte declined a compromise proposal 
prepared by Goremykin, the Tsar was left with no choice except for the signing the 
Manifesto of October. The Manifesto was signed on October 17 and informed the 
Russian people that freedom of speech, assembly, opinion, organization and press 
was granted; and the Duma was upgraded to a legislative body and the proposed 
system of election in Bulygin program was extended to include whole disfranchised 
groups. Following the signing of the October Manifesto, the Tsar appointed Witte as 
the President of the Council of Ministers since he did not have another choice76; and 
General Trepov resigned on October 21.  
With the October Manifesto, the second stage of Sohrabi’s theory of 
constitutional revolution starts. The October Manifesto was met with a great 
enthusiasm in the empire; people celebrated their newly won freedoms in the streets. 
On the other side, the conservatives were disappointed and dismayed. Moreover, the 
intelligentsia was also not sure about the new concessions of the Tsar. To illustrate, 
P. Miliukov considered the Manifesto as a great victory, but also as a new stage of 
the struggle”77. As for the Tsar, on the other hand, the Manifesto was an unwanted 
child78 and a grim concession as he said to his mother in one of his letters written on 
October 1979 :  
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“You remember, no doubt, those January days when we were 
together at Tsarkoye-they were miserable, weren’t they? But they 
are nothing in comparison with what happened now...All sorts of 
conferences took place in Moscow, which Durnovo permitted, I 
do not know why...God knows what happened in the 
universities...It makes me sick to read the news...Trepov made it 
quite plain to the populace by his own proclamations that any 
disorder would be ruthlessly put down...Through all those 
horrible days, I constantly met Witte...There were only two ways 
open; to find an energetic soldier to crush the rebellion by sheer 
force...That would mean rivers of blood, and in the end we 
should be where we had started...The other way out would be to 
give the people their civil rights, freedom of speech and press, 
also to have all laws confirmed by a State Duma-that of course, 
would be a constitution...Almost everybody I had an opportunity 
of consulting is of the same option...We discussed it for two days 
and in the end, invoking God’s help I signed...I had  nobody to 
rely on except  honest Trepov. There was no other way out than 
to cross oneself and give what everyone was asking for [italics 
are mine]...We are in the midst of a revolution with an 
administrative apparatus entirely disorganized, and in this lies 
the main danger [italics are mine].” 
 
However, as the Tsar might have noticed in the above given letter, the 
revolution was in the midst of its existence. Thus, the October Manifesto failed to put 
an end to the revolutionary situation in the country. In fact, as Harcave stressed, “the 
October Manifesto preceded, rather than followed, the most serious revolutionary 
disturbances”80 since as we have already mentioned, the concessions were regarded 
by the opposition as a new opportunity and a path towards more radical concessions. 
Now, the solid ground on which the opposition groups had been united against the 
autocracy since the Bloody Sunday started to crackle since it was divided between 
two groups. One of them supported the idea that the October Manifesto and the 
Tsarist government should have been given a chance; and the other favored to go on 
the revolutionary struggle until the complete downfall of the autocracy and monarchy 
for a democratic republic or at least to secure an effective legislative control in the 
administrative machinery81.    
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In fact, the subject encampment among the opposition was partly caused by 
the fact the strategy of the old regime that agrees to ambiguous principles. The 
October manifesto also promised establishment of a State Duma with legislative 
powers, but the governing powers of the Duma, its legislative responsibilities and the 
election system for the representatives were the ambiguous issues82 that were open to 
different interpretations. As Healy says, “Everything is given, but nothing is 
given”83. Thus, these vague statements in the Manifesto crackled the solid ground of 
the opposition since the components of it had varying degrees of antagonism and 
hatred against the autocracy84.  
As we have said, a new struggle, which was more violent in nature, began 
both for the government in order to restore order and for the divided opposition in 
order to secure what the Tsar promised with the Manifesto or get more. Indeed, the 
subject ambiguities would be the main base of the struggle for the both groups’ 
legitimacy. Yet, what can be said generally is that the October Manifesto split the 
support of the people for radical opposition groups including the Soviet, which was 
deprived of its main bulk of support shortly after the Manifesto85, which can be seen 
in detail in Witte’s memoirs86.  
The fierce revolutionary upheavals occurred in the dni svobody (days of 
freedom) that lasted from October 18, 1905 to December 2, 1905 when the civic 
freedoms enjoyed widely by the people and no censorship on the press was imposed 
in the empire87.  In these struggles both groups, namely the government and the 
opposition tried to use both legal and extralegal methods to get more support. At first 
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the increase in the number of disorders throughout the country including worker, 
peasant, intelligentsia and student groups indicated the country was going towards a 
wrong direction as Nicholas II explained in one of his telegrams88:  
“Everybody is afraid of taking courageous action; I keep trying 
to force them-even Witte himself- to behave more 
energetically. With us nobody is accustomed to shouldering the 
responsibility: all expect to be given orders which, however, 
they disobeyed as often as not”. 
 
The internal situation passed through the months of October and November 
like that. In November, to illustrate, it was easy to start a strike than to terminate 
one89 and peasant risings, nationalist agitation and other disorders continued with a 
rising effect. However, gradually the state machinery began to handle the issue 
effectively through end of the days of freedom with punitive expeditions by which 
the government suppressed the rebellious peasants and striking workers with the use 
of police and military and lock-outs. As an important stage of the repression, the St. 
Soviet’s leaders were arrested on December 3 by the orders of Interior Minister 
Durnovo, whom Witte opposed. Yet, the closing of the curtail of the revolutionary 
upheavals occurred in Moscow where an armed uprising, following the calls for a 
general strike, against the government forces emerged and lasted until mid-December 
with a bloody victory of the government forces.  
With the suppression of the Moscow armed uprising by the government the 
third stage in which counter-revolutionary policies were imposed and most of the 
winnings of the revolution were undermined by the tsarist government began. The 
second stage, following the promulgation of the October Manifesto, was outweighed 
by the government rather than the opposition groups, which failed to keep their unity 
and whose affiliation with the quasi-governmental bodies like the Soviets weakened 
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after October 17. After the Soviets were crushed and the zemstvos were turned 
against the constitution; and securing the loyalty of the army, the tsarist government 
proved to be successful in running the state machine again. Now, it was an easy task 
for the government to carry out counter-revolutionary applications in the third stage 
without disorders and upheavals. Thus, the Tsarist regime was able to survive the 
first revolution from below. Ivar Spector argues that the Tsarist regime succeeded in 
suppressing the revolution because of the October Manifesto, which split off the 
opposition forces that was composed of almost all layers of the Russian society and 
of the end of the Japanese War, following which troops returned to European Russia 
from Far East and became very effective in suppressing the uprisings and disorders 
throughout the empire90. Yet, Witte says in his memoirs that Russia was saved by a 
large foreign loan secured and as Spector stresses by the return of army from Far 
East.91 One more reason that can be added to them is the lack of structural divisions 
in the Russian army as Sohrabi stresses due to the successful military reforms 
initiated by Peter the Great and continued by the successor tsars92. Another 
interesting view that emphasizes the international support given by the reactionary 
European states to the Russian tsar can also be added the above-mentioned reasons93. 
Pankrotova argues that while the Russian empire helped extensively to the European 
empires to suppress the revolutions of 1848-1849, in 1905 it was the turn of the 
Europeans who saved the Russian empire from the revolution94. 
The other side of the medallion should also be taken into account, if the 
reforms had been implemented on time by the Tsar and the government or as Witte 
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proposed if the Tsar had been revolutionary from above and initiated the 
Europeanization of the empire before the people forced him to do, the revolution and 
the bloody months of 1905 might have been avoided. Nicholas II, as a strong and 
stubborn supporter of the autocracy, always became reluctant to give concessions, 
which were never granted on time, thus never pacified the people95. Moreover, the 
government pursued inconsistent and clumsy policies96 to cope with the 
revolutionary outbreaks and the lethargy, incompetence and timidity of the executive 
and administrative officers became an obstacle for the whole body of the government 
to take effective precautions97. Shortly, “it was not the revolutionary terrorists, but 
inflexible policy of the autocracy that raised the political temperature of all society98.  
Then, the road towards the establishment of a legislative Duma as said in the 
October Manifesto began and was paved under the auspices of the tsarist autocracy. 
In spite of the fact that the road ended at a different stop when compared with the 
prospects of the people; certain institutional changes, namely, political parties and a 
legislative Duma, were secured from the tsarist government. Firstly, the power of the 
Duma was restricted by unequal and indirect elections similar to what had been 
proposed by the Bulygin program and by empowerment of the State Council in the 
legislative process equal to the Duma. Moreover, in order to guarantee the future of 
the monarchy, “Fundamental Laws” including Tsar’s absolute veto power, 
discretionary power in financial affairs, right to issue emergency laws without 
approval of the Duma and the State Council and right to appoint ministers was 
issued99. At the end, Russia had an ambiguous regime something like “constitutional 
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autocracy”; and to illustrate, its entry in Almanach de Gotha, which was the 
yearbook of European royalty, changed after 1906 as a constitutional monarchy ruled 
by an autocrat100 or as Seton-Watson says the regime was neither autocracy nor 
constitutional monarchy, but something in between.101 
Therefore, subsequent to the revolution of 1905, a new path that would take 
the empire to the Bolshevik revolution, namely the end of the Russian Empire. When 
the conditions under which both revolutions took place were considered, one can see 
various similarities. Namely, both revolutions occurred when the Russian Empire 
was waging a war in the international arena and when certain economic difficulties 
and crises had affected peasantry and working class severely. In any case, the 
revolution of 1905 was over or the “dress-rehearsal” was completed and dress was 
ordered to be worn in the forthcoming years. 
1.2. The Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Ottoman Empire  
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman and the Russian Empires 
were of two traditional multi-ethnic and autocratic empires. They had, indeed, 
different paths of historical developments. Yet, both empires experienced similar 
attempts of reforms and constitutional developments as having similar imperial 
structures. In these empires, especially in the period of their late imperial years, the 
liberal intellectuals blamed their autocrat of the despotic imperial system that the 
ruler implemented and that separated their way of development from that of Western 
Europe.  
 Moreover, in the Russian and the Ottoman Empire, the nineteenth century 
was period of intensive reform when external forces and developments were of 
crucial importance for reforms. During this century, the Ottoman Empire had already 
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accepted the superiority of the West in the reign of Sultan Selim III and adopted 
measures to revitalize the situation.102 Also, the military defeats and nationalistic 
revolts of Greeks and Serbs and the revolt of Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt in the 
nineteenth century showed the Ottoman Empire its fatal weakness and corrupt 
system of military and administration. However, the reform process can be claimed 
to be a failure both in terms of modern military and of society, which according to 
Sohrabi played a crucial role in the forthcoming constitutional revolution in 1908103.  
 Both Russian and Ottoman empires watched the internal situation of each 
other closely and drew lessons from the reforms and attempts of reforms. To 
illustrate, when Mithat Pasha, who brought economic reforms and relative prosperity 
to the Ottoman Empire and prepared the 1876 Constitution, began to draft the Vilayet 
(province) Law of 1864, which was the first attempt to reorganize the Ottoman 
provincial administrative system; the Russian ambassador was alarmed and told the 
sultan that the subject law would undermine his rule over the provinces104. The 
Russian ambassador’s opinion about the Vilayet Law might have been affected by 
the zemstvo reforms of Alexander II in the Russian Empire.    
 Furthermore, both the Russian and the Ottoman empires were parts of the 
same circular chain of constitutional revolutions that came and shook the Eurasia at 
the beginning of the 20th century. The Russian revolution of 1905 was followed by 
the Ottomans in 1908, yet in a different way and from a relatively different source105.  
 
                                                 
102 See Standford J. Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-
1807 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) for a good description of reforms and 
transformation of the reform tradition of the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III. Also see, 
Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, two 
volumes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
103 Sohrabi, “Historicising...,  pp. 390-391.  
104 Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in 
the Late Ottoman State (New York : Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 267. 
105 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi (İstanbul İletişim Yayınları, 1995), see the introduction. 
 36 
1.2.1. The Ottoman Empire in 1905: Abdülhamid II and the rule of İstibdâd 
In the year 1905, the Ottoman empire was under the despotic and iron rule of 
Abdülhamid II, who was enthroned upon his promise to promulgate a constitution 
known as Kânun-u Esâsi in 1876 by the constitutionalist fraction within the 
bureaucracy and military. However, at that point, it should be noted that there is a 
significant difference between the constitutional movement of 1876 and of 1908 in 
the Ottoman empire. The 1876 movement was a result of the long-lasting efforts of 
reforms from above for which bureaucrats and military officials had worked hard; 
and initiated and carried out by a group of enlightened military and civil bureaucrats 
led by Mithat Pasha without a real support of the people. On the other hand, the 
revolution of 1908 would be supported by the people, minorities and middle-class 
throughout the empire, although the decisive role would be played by the army. 
Thus, at it can be seen, the Russian revolution of 1905 brought about partially a new 
understanding of revolution from below for the Ottoman revolutionary intellectual.  
The Kanun-i Esasi of 1876 was prepared as a very conservative constitution that had 
provided the Sultan with excessive powers, including the right to disperse the 
parliament, appoint ministers and provincial administrators, which were very similar 
to what Nicholas II would intend to do with the Fundamental Laws of 1906 that 
would be issued before the opening of the State Duma. 
In 1905, the Ottoman Empire had already lost much of its past glory and 
territory. In terms of economy, politics and of relations with foreign powers, the 
Ottoman empire had been within a process of peripheralization that had begun with 
the rise of Europe, especially in 18th century. The European powers including 
Britain, France, Austria-Hungary and Russia posed a permanent threat to the 
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existence of the empire and also an opportunity for the Sultan to defy each threat by 
allying itself with a different power block in the balance of power.  
Although Abdülhamid II declared himself in support of a constitutional 
regime, he did not hesitate to undermine the meaning of a constitutional assembly in 
which representatives of people would take part to an advisory body that was not 
able to promulgate laws. The subject power that the Sultan held produced the 
expected result and Abdülhamid II dissolved the Ottoman Assembly under the 
pretext of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 in accordance with the rights that he 
held. Abdülhamid II said in his memoirs106: 
“Our country is not mature enough to be governed with a 
constitutional regime, which would be a disaster for us. This system 
requires equality among the subjects, but our country is composed of 
various ethnic groups, including, Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, 
Bulgarians, Rumanians, Albanians and Jews...Our Young Turks are 
inclined to fantasize, because declaring a constitution in our country 
means an invitation for disorders among the people, which shakes 
the Ottoman Empire to its foundations.”  
 
Abdülhamid II wrote these sentences in 1905, when the news of the Russian 
revolution of 1905 was flourishing in the Yıldız Palace as we are going to see in the 
chapter III of the subject study. Thus, it is an undeniable possibility that Abdülhamid 
II regarded the events in the Russian empire as an example of constitutionalist 
struggle and logically argued in 1905 that if such disorders and uprisings had 
occurred in the Ottoman realm, the empire would have been buried in the pages of 
history books. In terms of his above-mentioned argument, one can claim that 
Abdülhamid II was right in trying to prevent such activities in the Ottoman empire, 
yet another undeniable fact is that the discontent among the people mostly arose from 
the oppressive rule of Abdülhamid II and his organization of informants, which 
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might cause an ordinary man to be exiled because of a word that he unconsciously 
used. History of Abdülhamid II’s reign is full of such absurd examples107.  
These were the years in which one of the most elaborate spy systems, as 
mentioned above, which was composed of legal and illegal informants, in the history 
of monarchy was effective throughout the empire and outside the empire108. Through 
this system, Abdülhamid II kept himself informed of every development taking place 
within the empire or related with the empire. The informants received a certain 
amount of money or additional salary if they were government officials. Thus, 
following the declaration of the constitution (Kânun-i Esâsî) in 1876, an age of 
despotism under Abdülhamid II began.   
At that time, the importance of the press in shaping the public opinion had 
already been understood by the Palace and by the opposition movement. Therefore, 
censorship was tightened with the application of Martial Law Regulation of 1878 and 
in 1882 not only political, but every kind of journals and newspapers were included 
within the framework of censorship109. The instructions that were forwarded from the 
Palace to the Directorate of Press indicated the borders of censorship in the Ottoman 
Empire110:                           
“* Priority is to be given to the news with regard to the precious 
health of the Sultan, production, trade and industrial 
developments. 
* No novels or articles are to be published without approval of 
the Ministry   of National Education. 
* Long literary or scientific articles are not to be published and 
no usage of the phrases, like “to be continued”. 
* No gaps in the articles.  
* Government officials are not to be criticized. 
* Petitions complaining about corruptions, which are submitted 
to the Sultan, are not to be published. 
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* Certain geographical or historical names, for example Armenia, 
are not to be used. 
* Assassinations attempted against the foreign rulers and 
demonstrations in foreign countries are not to be written.  
* These instructions are not to be published.”  
Abdülhamid II was also very decisive about establishing his rigid order 
throughout the country. He banned all the words like freedom (hürriyet), republic 
(cumhuriyet), constitution (kânun-u Esâsî), equality (uhuvvet), fatherland (vatan), 
national right (millet hakkı), deputies (mebusân) and so on from the press and 
theaters and the effective network of internal informants who regularly reported to 
the Palace about suspicious activities of anybody or of anything kept the Sultan 
informed 111.    
Both centralization (diminishing the power of bureaucracy and other 
peripheral forces) and nationalization of monarchy started during the reign of 
Abdülhamid II. His reign is interpreted by many historians as “return to centrality of 
Mahmud II”, which was viewed as absolutism112.  Abdülhamid II was well aware of 
the power struggle between the bureaucracy that had been increased its effect since 
Tanzimat and the Palace. He worked to be the only authority and transform the 
power of bureaucracy into the throne again. Abdülhamid II gradually eliminated the 
new bureaucracy and even ulemâ (religious scholars) in order to be the only authority 
in terms of religion as the caliph113. He opened modern departments of theology in 
Dâr-ü’l Fünûn and thus diminished the social power of ulemâ. He transformed the 
decision-making process from government departments to the palace114. 
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Thus, the year 1905 for the people in the Ottoman Empire was passing under 
the istibdâd rule of Abdülhamid II who suppressed all opponent elements within the 
empire and imposed a suffocating censorship to the press and tried to de-politicize all 
layers of the society by various repressive methods and laws. In a few years, the 
discontent of the people would create the necessary nucleus for a constitutional 
revolution especially among the intellectuals who had to leave the country due to the 
pressures.  
 One of the most outstanding events that stirred up the Ottoman government 
in Istanbul in 1905 was the mutiny of the battleship of Potyomkin belonging to the 
Russian fleet in the Black Sea. Sultan Abdülhamid II warned the government 
officials to take every possible precaution to prevent the battleship to come to the 
Straits. Indeed, Abdülhamid II was afraid of the spread of such mutinies to the 
Ottoman army whose loyalty was already questionable and which would be the main 
dynamic of the revolution of 1908115. Actually, due to his such fears, the Ottoman 
navy that had been modernized by Abdülhamid II’s predecessors fell into abeyance 
in the Marmara Sea.  As we are going to see, the Ottoman revolutionary press also 
covered the issue in detail and severely criticized the government in handling it. 
Nicholas II and Abdülhamid II were corresponded through the ambassadors and 
decided to help each other for suppressing the subject mutiny in the Black Sea116. 
Yet, Abdülhamid II in these years failed to prevent the spread of the 
revolutionary seeds in the Ottoman army.  Apart from the fact that officers were the 
leaders of the 1908 revolution in the Ottoman army, an interesting letter written by 
the Ottoman officers upon the execution of Lieutenant Pyotr Petrovich Schmidt, who 
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led the Sevastopol uprising of December 1905, to the victim’s family shows the 
strong revolutionary sentiments that had rooted in the Ottoman army117: 
“We, too, make a pledge to the great citizen Schmidt. We make a 
vow over his corpse, which is dear to us and to the Russian 
people. We swear that we will fight to the last drop of our blood 
for sacred, civic freedom, for which cause of many our great 
citizens have perished. We vow that we will exert all our strength 
and means to acquaint the Turkish people with event in Russia, 
so that by our common effort we may achieve the right for 
ourselves to live as human beings.” 
  
The idea that the Turkish constitutional revolutionists appreciated the Russian 
revolution of 1905 and affiliated it with the revolution of 1908 in Turkish is well 
illustrated by Paul Miliukov, who participated the ceremonies of enthronement of 
Mehmed V after Abdülhamid II by the revolutionaries. P. Miliukov stresses that he 
was received by the Turks as a comrade-in-arms and was questioned about the 
Russian revolution of 1905.118  
1.2.2.Young Turks 
 The first organized Turkish opposition known as İttihad-ı Osmani was 
formed in 1889 by İshak Sukûtî, Mehmed Reşad, Abdullah Cevdet, İbrahim Temo 
and Hüseyinzade Ali in Military School of Medicine119. Subsequent to their contact 
with Ahmet Rıza in Paris, the name of the organization was changed as the 
Committee of Union and Progress120. This new opposition would be known as 
Young Turk opposition. Moreover, as most of the scholars argued Young Turk 
movement should be taken into account as a part of the modernization process that 
the Ottoman empire had gone through. In fact, the name attributed to them, Young 
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Turks, is a general title used for every group of opposition against the 
authoritarianism of Abdülhamid II121 since the time was a “world time” for the 
opposition to the regime of Abdülhamid II.  Revolutionary youth, mainly influenced 
by the Young Ottoman thought, formed an organized opposition firstly known as 
İttihâd-ı Osmani and then as Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), yet generally 
called Jeunes Turcs by everyone else122. Members of the CUP had two immediate 
objectives that were deposition of Abdülhamid II and restoration of the 
constitution123. Thus, the Young Ottomans of the previous generation, in the next 
generation, became Young Turks.  As Norman Stone argues, “even the foundation-
date was symbolic in a European sense.  In 1889, the centennial of the French 
Revolution, the Second International was founded  – delegates profited from cheap 
railway fares offered in Paris: the Italian socialist party was similarly founded in 
1892, courtesy of cheap fares to Genoa for the Columbus celebrations”.124  
 Young Turks did never pose an ideology of their own and tried to bridge this 
gap by adopting popularized versions of the ideologies and ideas discussed in 
Europe, and by adopting political and social ideas developed out of the revolutionary 
circles of Abdülhamid II era.125 Yet, there are certain common features of the Young 
Turk thought, which were their orientation to the West126 and their belief that if the 
necessary precautions through modernization had not been taken in order to put an 
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end to the degeneracy of the Ottoman empire; the empire would have collapsed127. 
Apart from these points, in fact, the Young Turk organizations varied from center to 
center. To illustrate, while a cadre composed of Armenians and Turks carried out the 
opposition activities in Mersin; in Egypt, Christians were not allowed to join the 
ranks of Young Turk opposition. Thus, it is impossible to say that all these Young 
Turk groups shared the same ideology and world-view128. Since the nucleus of the 
Young Turk organization, the CUP, emerged in Tıbbiye (Faculty of Medicine); the 
Young Turks had generally materialist world views. At the end of the 19th century, 
young intellectuals and school-going youth began to regard the subject organizations 
as sacred129:  
“In 1307 (G. 1891)…Something mysterious was being 
whispered among the students. Apparently, an organization has 
been established. But, where and for what? There was no answer 
to these questions. These hide more mysterious things…The 
organization, in my view, was something sacred.” 
 
The Young Turks, who were called erbâb-ı fesâd (troublemakers) or eşhâs-ı 
muzırra (vermin people) in the Ottoman official documents, mainly carried out their 
opposition activities in European countries and in Egypt. They published their first 
pamphlet in 1895 and then with the participation of more and more Ottoman 
intellectuals, who fled from the Ottoman empire; the activities of the Young Turks 
intensified and accelerated in the European centers and in Egypt until the year of 
1908 when officers of Union and Progress seized power in the Ottoman empire. 
Thus, even following the revolution they could not follow a defined program due to 
the fragmentations among them became apparent after Adbülhamid II’s regime 
ended in 1908.  
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 1.2.3. Young Turk Press 
 History of the Ottoman press dates back to the year 1831 when Takvim-i 
Vekâyı was established upon the order of Mahmud II. During 1860s, the importance 
of journals and newspapers increased and some journals and newspapers began to 
publish articles regarding the concepts like freedom, homeland and equality, which 
had not been known properly by the Ottomans until that time. In fact, Ottoman 
people learnt such concepts from the press.130  
 Abdülhamid II was aware of the power that the press possessed over the ides 
of intellectuals and ordinary reader. As we have already mentioned, during his reign 
all oppressive measures were taken to silence the Ottoman press regarding dangerous 
issues that people should not have heard. However, as for the Young Turks, most of 
whom fled to Europe to continue their opposition, the only way to reach the Ottoman 
public was the press. Thus, both sides understood the importance of press in shaping 
the minds of people. Then, the Young Turks began to publish their journals in 
European cities including Paris, Geneva, London, Brussels, Sofia, Berlin and in 
Egypt in Cairo, where the Sultan did not have a punitive power. The only precaution 
that Abdülhamid II could take against these publications was to urge France, 
England, Switzerland, and Germany to close down these journals or to offer money 
to the publishers in exchange for stopping their publications131. There were about 160 
Young Turk journals published in various European countries and in Egypt. 
However, most of them were short-lived and could only publish few numbers or 
closed down because of financial problems. In addition to that, there was a great 
difference between the Young Turk journals, which were published in big cities of 
                                                 
130 Muammer Göçmen, İsviçre’de Jön Türk Basını ve Türk Siyasal Hayatına Etkileri (İstanbul: 
Kitabevi, 1995), p. 73. 
131 Ibid., p. 96; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Jön Türk Basını”, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p. 845. 
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Europe and Egypt by the Ottoman elites, and the Young Turk journals, which were 
published locally in the regions that had newly separated from the Ottoman empire or 
still under its political domination. The difference was while the Young Turk 
journals of big European cities and Cairo dealt with issues discussed in Europe at 
that time and freely criticized the Sultan; the local Young Turk journals mostly wrote 
about local issues and were not free to directly criticize the Sultan and Ottoman 
administration132, due to the pressures that the Ottoman empire could apply to the 
newly independent states and other regions in which these journals were 
published133. Therefore, these local Young Turk journals were excluded from the 
scope of this study. Thus, during the Russian revolution of 1905, only the journals 
studied in this thesis and a few others whose collections are not complete or in 
special archives continued to be published in Europe and in Egypt.  
 When the journals, Türk, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, Feryad, Osmanlı, and İctihad are 
considered, certain common facts can be found. First of all, these journals had a rigid 
ideological perspective in line with the Young Turk group that published them. 
Secondly, main target of all these journals was Abdülhamid II and his regime of 
despotism. When mentioning the Russian revolution of 1905, most of the articles 
ended with warnings that these events were likely to take place in the Ottoman 
empire due to the regime of Abdülhamid II and his character. Moreover, the subject 
journals always tried to agitate people by stressing how Russians revolted and gained 
their freedom from their oppressor Tsar. Also, as Göçmen argues, since the 
distribution of the copies was harder than publishing; the dimensions of the journals 
were smaller than a normal newspaper.134  
                                                 
132 Ibid., p. 845. 
133 Ömer Turan, The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1908 (Ankara: TTK, 1998), p. 290. 
134 Ibid., p.252. 
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Lastly, these journals always found a way to enter the Ottoman realm and 
read in the empire by the intellectuals in spite of the all efforts of the Ottoman 
government to prevent them. Therefore, although the censorship implemented by the 
Palace was rigid, it can be said that it was not that successful. As one foreign resident 
of Istanbul noted in 1903135: 
“The Turkish press Censor confiscates all European journals 
containing references to the internal affairs of Turkey, or her relations 
with the Powers, and prohibits the publication of native press of any 
news of practical importance to the Turkish public. And it is only, 
therefore, by intercourse with European acquaintances, who receive 
their correspondence and newspapers through medium of the foreign 
post offices-English, French and Austrian-that an intelligent Turk is 
enabled to obtain a knowledge of current political events” 
 
Thus, press and publication were the only and the most effective means of 
spreading their ides for the Young Turk groups. In spite of pressures of the Ottoman 
government and permanent informant activities of the Sultan, the publishers of these 
journals were able to carry out their struggles against the rule of Abdülhamid II in 
Europe. The Ottoman revolutionary publications, which always found a way to be 
circulated in the Ottoman realm, became the main place of discussions that were 
written without censorship regarding the international and domestic events going on 
related with the Ottoman empire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 Quoted by Palmira Brummett, Image and Imperialism..., from Lucy Garnett, Turkish Life in Town 
and Country (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1911). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
2. PRESS AS A MIRROR OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905 
IN THE OTTOMAN REALM 
As we have already mentioned, the Ottoman press in the capital, Istanbul, 
was under a heavy censorship of Abdülhamid II, who managed to secure Istanbul 
free from revolutionary activities. The journal headlines in Istanbul in 1905 devoted 
their pages to the Russo-Japanese war and the defeat of the Russian empire at the 
hands of an Asiatic nation. Moreover, other news related with the Russian empire 
could be allowed under the condition that they should not offend the dilhâh-i 
hümâyûn (tolerance limit of the Sultan). To illustrate, İkdam informed about the 
construction of a new military harbor in the Russian empire just subsequent to the 
October Manifesto136. Yet, nothing about the great events of the year of 1905 was 
mentioned in the same journals137.  However, the Young Turk journals published 
abroad, especially in Paris, Cairo, Sofia and Geneva were instrumental in bringing 
the news of the Russian revolution to the Ottoman empire through foreign post 
offices which was not under full control of the Ottoman government.  
2.1 Publishers and the Ottoman Revolutionary Journals 
In this part, repercussions of the Russian revolution of 1905 in the 
revolutionary Ottoman press are going to be analyzed. In order to handle this task, 
Ottoman revolutionary journals of Türk, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, Feryad, Osmanlı and 
İctihad published from 1904 to 1906 have been studied in detail. Türk, which, 
according to Hanioğlu, was a cornerstone of Turkish nationalism, began to be 
                                                 
136 İkdam, October 16, 1905. 
137 Uygur Kocabaşoğlu and Metin Berge, Bolşevik İhtilali ve Osmanlılar (Ankara: Kebikeç, 1994), p. 
20. 
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published in Cairo following the Congress of 1902138. The journal Şûrâ-yı Ümmet 
(Council of People) again started to be published after the same Congress on April 
10, 1902 in Paris with a program declaring that the journal would work for the 
freedom of the Ottoman empire from the foreign powers and from the despots139. 
Feryad (Cry), whose aim was to reach a rapprochement between the Bulgarians and 
Turks140, began to be published in Sofia by Mustafa Ragıp in September 1905141. 
Although it was published in Sofia, the subject journal did criticize the Ottoman 
government and wrote about the Russian revolution of 1905. Osmanlı (Ottoman) was 
published from December 1, 1897 until the end of 1904 by İshak Sukûtî, Tunalı 
Hilmi, Abdullah Cevdet, Nuri Ahmet, Reşit, Halil Muvaffak, Halil Bey and Refik 
Bey142. İctihad started to be published in Geneva by Abdullah Cevdet on September 
1, 1904 as a part of Ottoman cultural renaissance143.  
Indeed, there was not a monolithic Ottoman revolutionary or Young Turk 
press in 1905; the journals indicated above showed certain ideological and 
methodological differences pertaining to their struggle with the Hamidian regime and 
interpreting the events going on in the Ottoman Empire and in Europe at that time. 
However, as for the Russian revolution of 1905, their interpretations and 
commentaries were claimed to be close to each other in comparison with their 
debates regarding the constitutional struggle in the Ottoman empire and its means.  
The main source of the subject journals in terms of getting the news about the 
events going on in the Russian empire was the European news agencies, European 
and Russian journals, Turkic journals, which mushroomed following the revolution 
                                                 
138 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks 1902-1908 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 65. 
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of 1905 in the Russian empire especially Tercüman that was published by İsmail 
Gaspıralı in accordance with the Ottoman grammar and Hayat that was published in 
a simplified Turkish144, and telegrams cabled from the Russian empire by Russian 
Turkic-Muslims. Tercüman was an important source for the Ottomans publishers 
during the revolution. In fact, Tercüman itself was distributed and read in the 
Ottoman empire. Hayat, which was published in Azerbaijan, was also very 
influential among the Ottoman publisher and readers. Even, the Sultan Abdülhamid 
II asked the Tsar Nicholas II to prevent entrance of these journals to the Ottoman 
empire145. References to the Russian papers in the Young Turk journals covered 
revolutionary, liberal and conservative papers. To illustrate, the reader can find a 
reference to conservative Novoe Vremya and to revolutionary Izvestia in the same 
issue of the Ottoman journal. However, since they were struggling for the same end, 
interpretations in the Ottoman journals were mostly based on liberal or revolutionary 
Russian journals. Yet, generally speaking, it is very easy to see that these journals 
interpreted the events in the Russian empire and the revolution of 1905 and its 
aftermath through the European glasses mostly. 
It should also be said that they acquired the news more lately than they could 
have done and very often wrote the dates of the events inaccurately. Moreover, some 
Russian names and concepts were also given inconsistently in most of their news, 
which can create confusion for a reader who does not have a deep knowledge of the 
revolutionary era of the Russian empire in 1905. Furthermore, dates of the events in 
these journals sometimes are given erroneously due to the confusion of the Gregorian 
calendar with Julian one.  
                                                 
144 Hakan Kırımlı, Kırım Tatarlarında Milli Kimlik ve Milli Hareketler (1905-1916), (Ankara: TTK, 
1996), p. 39, 40,146. 
145 Spector, The First Russian..., p.  
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Therefore, this chapter is designed to analyze the understanding and 
interpretations of the Russian revolution of 1905, which was led by the same goals in 
a very neighbor empire with similar structures. The central idea here is that the 
Russian example was watched closely and an organic tie was tried to be established 
between the reasons and results of the Russian revolution; and those of possible 
Ottoman constitutional revolution. In order to achieve the mentioned aim, the 
Ottoman revolutionary journals published during the years of Russian revolution 
outside the Ottoman empire were studied. Most of the current collections of the 
Ottoman press in Turkey, have gaps. Yet, they are adequate to show how the course 
of events in the Russian revolution of 1905 was told to the people and what 
comments were made on this revolution.  
2.2. An overview of the Ottoman Revolutionary Press 
2.2.1.  His Majesty or Tsar the Oppressor 
One of the basic features of the censorship over the press in Istanbul is related 
with the titles and adjective used to describe the Tsar. When the Istanbul press 
mentioned the Tsar, they always used Çar Hazretleri (His Majesty) and other 
glowing titles. However, in the Ottoman revolutionary press published abroad 
without being censored, the Tsar generally described with titles and adjectives like 
bloody, oppressor, absolutist (müstebid) and with other humiliating words. In Şûrâ-yı 
Ümmet, the Tsar was described146:  
 
“If humanity and society had disciplined the Tsar properly, today, a 
revolution would not have spread all over the Russian empire like a 
clap of thunder that threatens the existence of the Russian 
government....the Tsar has now proved to be a friend of old 
Abdülhamid in the hell...” 
 
                                                 
146 “Rusya’da Fikir ve Asker”, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, no. 71, March 21, 1905. 
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The Tsar was also regarded as a disingenuous autocrat by the Ottoman 
revolutionary press. Moreover, the Tsar was not only criticized because he was an 
autocrat, but also he was trying to halt the progressive movements and developments 
in the Ottoman empire147. In fact, if one considers revolutionary movement at that 
time as a progress and development, what the journals said; then, the argument is 
true because there were several agreements signed between the Russian and Ottoman 
empires in order to co-operate in the struggle against revolutions in both empires148. 
2.2.2.  “Awakening of the Poor and Oppressed Russians” 
On December 29, 1904, about 10 days after the declaration of December 12 
ukaz in the Russian empire, there appeared news on the first page of Türk mentioning 
how the Tsar was forced to carry out reforms (ıslahat) in the empire because of the 
pressure of the people from below. The journal also stressed, “We ourselves know 
very well the evil of oppression of throne from which the Russian people are 
suffering. Although, we, the Ottomans, should be pleased about the subject 
oppression in the land of our rival and enemy, Russian empire; we are not so since 
we do not like oppression”149. In the same column, it was also said, “look at what the 
uprisings that the people carried out brought about: the Great Empire was forced to 
issue declarations”150. On the same ukaz, another revolutionary journal Osmanlı 
added that such reform movements had not been considered to be implemented by 
the Russian government, because oppressive policies implemented by these 
absolutist had been met nothing except for patience and endurance151.  
In fact, the revolutionary journals started to tell about the zemstvo movement 
and their petition, or as Türk wrote warning note (muhtıra) to the Tsar mentioning 
                                                 
147 See Türk, no. 87, July 6, 1905 and “Muharebe ve İhtilâl”, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, no. 72, April 6, 1905. 
148 See the Chapter III. 
149 “Rusya’da Islahat”, Türk, no. 61, December 29, 1904. 
150 Türk, no. 61, December 29, 1904. 
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oppressive policies of the government, misadministration of the officials, equality in 
law at the end of 1904152. Furthermore, the students’ meetings and demonstrations, 
favoring civic freedoms and constitution were given in full detail with numbers of 
the students included in the demonstrations, the places and the following 
announcements of the Tsar. According to Türk published on December 22, 1904 
three thousand students marched in St. Petersburg and gathered in Nevskii Square, 
yet they were dispersed by the Cossack regiments. Upon this, the Tsar announced 
that the old regime would continue and he would leave the throne intact and having 
full autocratic powers to his son153.  
Interestingly, the journals had full details of the events, and, as it has been 
said; these details were provided from European sources and telegrams; indeed, there 
was not any Ottoman or Young Turk news agency and no reporter in the Russian 
empire. To illustrate, Türk described a meaningful event occurred in a theatre. While 
Tsar’s uncle, Grand Duke Aleksei, was sitting in a box and talking with upper-class 
people around his box, a man shouted at him, “Give our money back. All your 
richness is the seized money of the peasants”154. Issues of both Türk and Osmanlı 
journals published in December 1904 gave detailed information of the uprisings and 
the growing disorders with the ongoing political developments155.  
2.2.3. “Internal Situation of Russia and Growing Disorders; or the Rising of the 
Sun of Freedom” 
Türk dated January 26 mentioned the “Bloody Sunday” with a great 
enthusiasm. It wrote that about 400,000 workers (amele)* marched towards the 
                                                 
152 Türk, no. 59, December 15, 1904. 
153 Türk, no. 60, December 22, 1904. 
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Winter Palace under the leadership of 24- year-old** Gapon. A point that should be 
stressed here is that the journal pointed out that some groups of soldiers did not fire 
on them by failing to obey the orders, yet Cossack regiments and other regiments 
attacked on the workers and killed about three or four hundred, in line with the 
journal156. The “Bloody Sunday” scene was put on the stage tragically by Şûrâ-yı 
Ümmet published on March 21 as follows157: 
“Thousands of hungry and destitute people, including children, 
women and aged oppressed under autocratic rule and 
misadministration of the officials marched to the residence of their 
“little father”, Tsar, to tell him their desperate living conditions; 
and kneeled on the snow and said, ‘We are in a desperate 
situation…we even prefer to be died instead of living in such 
conditions. We came here took refugee with your greatness for the 
reforms that you promised to carry out in order to improve our 
lives’. The Tsar, who has been quiet for a long while, then began to 
talk. And answered, ‘Shoot them!’. The soldiers were firing on the 
people. The people were being fired and their blood was flowing on 
the northern snow. The was one thing, however, that the bullets and 
swords of the soldiers, who had been defeated by the Japanese and 
now was winning over their own brothers, could never kill: 
‘thought’”.*   
 
 Although, as it really was, the “Bloody Sunday” was regarded by the 
Ottoman revolutionary press as a turning point and often referred in the forthcoming 
issues; another turning point for them had been the assassination of Plehve, which, to 
illustrate, Osmanlı saw as a point that initiated the reforms. Moreover, the 
assassination also attracted attention, according to the same journal, in the Ottoman 
court and the Sultan immediately requested the full details of the event from his St. 
Petersburg Ambassador Hüsnü Paşa in order to take precautions to protect himself 
from similar attempts158.  
                                                 
** Gapon was 35 years old at that time. 
156 Türk, no.65, January 26, 1905. 
157 “Rusya’da Fikir ve Asker”, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, no. 71, March 21, 1905. 
* Indeed, it did not happen this way. 
158 Osmanlı, September 5, 1904. 
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Events following the “Bloody Sunday” were watched carefully by the 
Ottoman revolutionary press. Türk told that the Tsar decided to convey an assembly 
composed of Grand Dukes under the presidency of Grand Duke Vladimir on January 
21-22 in order to take measures to deal with the people who were ready to struggle 
for freedom159. In the same issue, it was also said, “while the Grand Duke does not 
seem around in the Japanese War, now he has showed up against the people”160. Türk 
also wrote that the event was a massacre; and students, soldiers and workers 
immediately reacted against the government; and no one knows where the Tsar was 
at that time161. In the same vein, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet said, “Today, there is no way out for 
the supporters of freedom. Russia is awakening; workers are awakening, peasants are 
awakening, millions are awakening”162.  Tsar Nicholas II’s reception of worker 
representatives and his declaration of grief about the “Bloody Sunday” was also 
given in Türk with news about the arrest and the letter to the officers of Maksim 
Gorkii, who was interestingly declared as a hero among freedom fighters and a man 
of noble-character who grew up among the real people. He was told to be one of the 
most important names of the whole world, “a citizen of civilization” and a freedom 
fighter163. Moreover, Mirsky’s replacement with Bulygin was depicted; and it was 
said that measures to satisfy the people were considered and the rumors about a 
possible people’s assembly was ungrounded164. Türk published a verse about the 
position of the Tsar, which meant, “Although the Tsar does not want such situations; 
he desperately has to implement reforms”165:  
“Hâsılı istemiyorsa da bu gibi hâleti; 
                                        Çar, nâçar kabul etmeli ıslahâtı” 
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Şûrâ-yı Ümmet regarded all these events taking place in the Russian empire 
something that had been long expected and said, “Russia is being shaken by an 
earthquake that happened as a result of Russia’s past and future”. Moreover, the 
subject journal pointed out that in order to save its existence, the autocratic 
government, at that time, had to fight in all fronts; in Manchuria, in St. Petersburg, in 
Moscow and in other parts of the empire166. In an article written by Turgud in Türk 
dated March 9, 1905, the author said that the Russian revolutionary movements were 
of vital importance for their journal and that although they had predicted the current 
situation in their previous issues; they had failed to estimate the current scale of the 
disorders which were participated by many and growing number of Russians. The 
same author also wrote167:  
“….Thus, the Russian people began to revolt in order to secure 
that the people must rule over themselves; and they want this by 
their blood. As a reporter wrote from St. Petersburg, there is a 
difference between this revolt [Bloody Sunday—M.Y.] and the 
French revolt. The Russians were led by a priest like a flock of 
sheep…According to the reporter, what is dangerous in Russia is 
that the Russians are ready to die….I wish they [minorities in the 
Caucasus, including Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Circassians, 
Daghestanis] do side with the oppressed Russians and gain their 
independence by fighting with them…The statue of autocracy in 
Russia is tottering and will be overthrown in very near future…” 
 
 Thus, the revolution, according to the Ottoman revolutionary press, began in 
the Russian empire. “What comes into being everywhere in Russia, in the classroom 
of the universities, among the ordinary people, craftsmen and workers is 
‘revolution’”, stressed Şûrâ-yı Ümmet on March 21, 1905168. Meanwhile, Türk 
claimed that ministers who are trying to prepare a program of reform fell into 
disfavor; and the Tsar under the impact of the supporters of autocracy published an 
                                                 
166 “Rusya’da Fikir ve Asker”, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, no. 71, March 21, 1905. 
167 Turgud, “Rusya Ahvali”, Türk, no. 71, March 9, 1905. 
168 “Rusya’da Fikir ve Asker”, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, no. 71, March 21, 1905. 
 56 
ukaz, which confirmed the continuation of autocratic regime in Russia169.  However, 
Ottoman revolutionaries estimated that if Witte, who favored reforms, and the Tsar 
had failed to carry out reforms, the people themselves would have done the subject 
reforms from below170.  
 The subsequent chain of events was given in full detail in the Ottoman 
revolutionary press. To illustrate, Türk wrote that a bombing attempt on Warsaw 
Police Director171; and that people plundered and burnt the market place and freed 
the prisoners in Yalta172. According to Türk again, the journals in Russia began to 
debate the nature of the assembly to be established. Türk here made a comment and 
said, “we know that there was an ancient assembly in Muskovy known as zemskii 
sobor; however, now Russia is an empire having subjects from every language and 
race, thus such an assembly is not adequate”. Moreover, in the same issue, it was 
written that every attempt of reform to be made by Bulygin would probably like that 
of Plehve173. In the spring and summer days, the importance of what was going on 
in the Russian empire was well understood and from that time on journals devoted 
more space to the situation in Russia. For example, Türk began to publish a column 
entitled “The Internal Situation of Russia” as of May 11, 1905.   
 From that time on, the journal Türk informed its readers in every issue about 
the situation and the ongoing disorders and revolts in Russia. With regard to this, 
however, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet continued to publish more commentary articles with 
comparisons with the Ottoman empire. The Zemstvo Congress and its declaration 
was published on June 22, 1905 by Türk under the title “Zemstvo Address to the 
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Tsar”174 and the Tsar’s answer, which, in fact, was the event that the Tsar received a 
zemstvo delegation under the presidency of Prince Trubetskoi, was given in detail 
with the full text of Trubetskoi’s speech and the Tsar’s reply in Türk on July 6, 
1905175.  
 As the revolution in the Russian empire continued to grow, the Ottoman 
opposition journals gave more and more space for them. Now, these journals began 
to publish long articles delving into the history of the Russian empire and the 
conditions that paved the way for a revolution. A very sociological article was 
published in Şûrâ-yı Ümmet on September 14, to illustrate, in order to provide the 
reader with background of the disorders in the Russian empire176: 
 “…Revolution is, on the other hand, the sudden and violent change 
in the society’s structure…Now, Russia is in a revolution. 
 Power belongs to one or a few classes in every society…One of the 
reasons of the current revolution in Russia is that several classes in 
Russia is trying to get the power from an autocrat… 
 ...The method of administration that the Petr the Great wanted to 
install in Russia was the method of bureaucracy (usul-u idare-i 
memurin). The commander and the supervisor of the army of 
bureaucracy would be the Tsar, himself [the foundations of the 
autocracy—M.Y.]…  
 …Improvement of industry and trade in the empire paved the way 
for the formation and strengthening of the opposition parties… 
 Generally, the industrial workers are different from the peasants, 
agrarian workers…the industrial workers are more attentive than 
the agrarian workers to the new ideas that might lead to reforms of 
their situation, improve their social conditions…The industrial 
workers are openly hostile to the Tsar…and the agrarian workers 
have gradually withdrawn its support from the Tsarist bureaucracy 
and opposition have strengthened among them…. 
 …If agrarian disturbances occurring in various provinces are 
organized and bulk of the peasants are attracted by the opposition, 
then if the army most of which is composed of the peasants follows 
the suit; the Tsarist government will come to an end.”  
 
In the same vein, when the revolution and its fruits become visible by the 
Ottoman revolutionaries, the journal Türk also published a series of long articles 
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under the title of “A Comment on Russia” written by Dündar as of June 29, 1905. 
This series lasted for nine chapters and covered the history of Russia from the oldest 
times. In addition to this, the long articles on the revolutionary situation in Russia 
started to appear on the first pages of its issues. For instance, an article entitled “An 
Observation on the Internal Situation of Russia” said177: 
“Russia in on the eve of a revolution. Up to now, the Russian 
government have tried to disorientate the European public by 
attributing only an economic base and character to the disorders 
among the workers…Strikes in Petersburg and Moscow; pogroms 
in Odessa and Warsaw; situation of the Black Sea fleet show that 
Russia is pregnant with a revolution which will change the 
backward face of Russia and which threatens the Tsarist regime. 
The Tsar is helpless and looking for a remedy. Ministers are 
resigning one by one. The people are coming close to an end. 
Soldiers in the Far East have sided with the people now…There are 
two groups of revolutionists in Russia now. One group wants to 
change everything in Russia and the other groups favors the 
Tsar…”  
 
 Meanwhile news concerning the disorders, strikes, uprisings and meetings of 
different groups were constantly given in the revolutionary newspapers. Informative 
news that appeared on the pages of Türk, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, Osmanlı and İctihad often 
ended with a sentence of comment that criticized the Tsar and his government, 
especially regarding his ignorance of people’s will and use of force against his 
people. Before delving into the path to the revolution of 1905 from the glasses of 
Ottoman revolutionary press, certain important points on which the Ottoman 
revolutionary press wrote extensively should be stressed and examined under 
separate titles. One of these important points is related with the mutiny of 
Potyomkin, which created an air of fear and alarm in the Palace in İstanbul. The 
others are the role of intelligentsia and of the peasants in the revolution of 1905 and 
the Muslim subjects of the Russian empire. The reason why the intelligentsia and 
the peasants are going to be examined under separate titles, in spite of the 
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importance of workers and their organizations and strikes in the revolution of 1905 
is that since there was not a class of industrial workers in the Ottoman empire, the 
main bulk of the people and the possible dynamic element of a people’s revolution, 
which was desired by the Ottoman revolutionaries, was the peasantry in Rumelia 
and in Anatolia, if we are to exclude middle-class and minorities. In addition to this, 
as a guide to them, the peasant uprisings and peasant organizations and their 
historically shaped situation in 1905 were among the extensively written topics of 
the time. In the same vein, the leading group of the revolutionary movement in the 
Ottoman empire was the intellectuals who were middle and upper class educated 
elements of the reformist generation that had its root in the Young Ottomans of the 
Tanzimat era. Hence, both the role and situation of the peasantry and of the 
intelligentsia was important for the Ottoman revolutionary groups in the revolution 
of 1905. Moreover, the Muslims of the Russian empire and their situation during the 
revolution and in the post-revolutionary era were written much by the Ottoman 
revolutionary intellectuals, which then necessitates to be considered under a sub-
title.  
2.2.4 “On the Battleship of Knyaz Potyomkin” 
 Understandably, the mutiny of Potyomkin battleship appeared on the first 
pages of many journals of the Ottoman revolutionaries and various comments on the 
subject event were made by their columnists. As Tahsin Paşa stresses in his 
memoirs, Abdülhamid II was very disturbed by the maneuvers of Potyomkin led by 
the mutineers in the Black Sea178. He especially feared that Potyomkin might have 
come to the Straits and made an impact on the soldiers of the Ottoman empire, 
which, according to Tahsin Paşa, one of the worst things for Abdülhamid II. 
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Reasons and the conditions of the Potyomkin mutiny were examined in detail by the 
revolutionary newspapers, but a bit differently. To illustrate, while İctihad 
mentioned the events and the pre-conditions of the mutiny as we are thought today 
including the rotten foods and bad behaviors of officers to the soldiers179; the journal 
Şûrâ-yı Ümmet wrote, “the officers had in their pockets the booklets of Sevastopol 
Society of Freedom and the soldiers had the principles that are written in these 
booklets in their hearts”, which included the officers of Potyomkin into the ranks of 
mutineers and revolutionists180.  
 The journal Şûrâ-yı Ümmet also claimed with regard to the Potyomkin 
battleships that Sultan Abdülhamid II asked his officials to do everything to keep the 
battleship out of the İstanbul Strait, because the empire did not have the necessary 
military capabilities even to overpower a single battleship due to the Abdülhamid 
II’s policy that caused the Ottoman fleet to perish in the Sea of Marmara since the 
Sultan always feared a navy uprising against himself181.  
 However, on the other hand, another revolutionary journal, İctihad, stressed, 
“Abdülhamid II  was so alarmed when he heard that Knyaz Potyomkin began to 
move towards İstanbul that he withdrawn his order to send two battleship to 
suppress the uprising in Yemen”, which meant that the empire had certain defense 
apparatus182. Moreover, Tahsin Paşa in his memoirs states that the Sultan ordered 
the defense artilleries located on the Straits to be strengthened183. The Potyomkin 
mutiny, thus, was “a reflection of the internal situation of the Russian empire and 
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also an event that shows the murders of the Hamidian government in the Ottoman 
empire”184. 
As it is going to be told in the next chapter, the Potyomkin issue did not end 
for Abdülhamid II when the battleship surrendered to the Rumanian authorities at 
Costanza. Since in accordance with the agreement that the mutineers made with the 
Rumanian government, the mutineers were given the right of asylum to Rumania, 
Abdülhamid II was informed that some of these people would come the Ottoman 
empire with Rumanian passport, which showed that the Potyomkin issue continued 
for another year for the Sultan, who was very afraid of spread of revolutionary ideas 
in the Ottoman empire. 
2.2.5 “The Intellectual Movement in Russia” 
In Şûrâ-yı Ümmet dated February 6, 1905, events going on in Russia were 
described with several comments and their possible and desired impacts on the 
Ottoman people with a special focus on the origins of the movement. Universities, in 
this article, were regarded as the main jumping point of the revolutionary ideas. By 
using the word, the universities; the journal meant both students and intellectuals in 
the Russian empire. Indeed, popular support of such a movement had also a great 
importance for the journal. The subject issue of Şûrâ-yı Ümmet  wrote185:  
“The fire of war conquers countries by destroying, burning; yet 
thoughts and ideas stemming from the universities conquer 
people. Then, sometimes both are pyrotic. However, the first is a 
regular fire, the latter is sun…For a while Russia has been 
experiencing thought of freedom and a struggle made for it and 
the county seems to be on the eve of a revolution. The said 
movement of thought that are going on in the autocratic Russia, 
in which the Tsar arbitrarily rules over 130 million people, are 
led by the universities…The Russian people led by the love of 
freedom and idea of a revolution seem ready like a floating mine 
to be fired. It was one of these Russian who blew up famous and 
cruel absolutist and Minister of Internal Affairs Plehve. When we 
compare the court of this Russian in which people’s 
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demonstration saved him from execution with the court of Mithat 
Paşa186, then, can we say that a movement of freedom has begun 
in Russia?.”  
 
 
Individual intellectuals were also written and their ideas and letters were 
given a space in the Ottoman revolutionary press of 1905. To illustrate, Türk 
published the full text of Maksim Gorkii’s letters, one of them was related with the 
“Bloody Sunday” and the other with the peasants187. In addition to Gorky, Tolstoy 
was also given attention and his interviews and letters were published in full text or 
as a long summary188. However, only the activities of the intellectuals in a revolution 
was not adequate for the Ottoman opposition groups, for example; Şûrâ-yı Ümmet in 
the same issue stressed the importance of support of the people provided for the 
struggle of intellectuals against autocracy 189:   
“In fact, about eight or ten years before now, our universities and 
education institutes had awakened in terms of the civic laws. In our 
universities, young intellectuals had laid the foundations of a 
movement of thought. However, this movement was eliminated by 
internal spies and the police. The newly born ideas were crushed with 
cruelty. What caused this? Either because of lack of knowledge or of 
understanding, the people failed to support and participate in the 
subject movement of thought. In Russia, a fleet admiral said boldly 
that the Kronstadt fleet was not ready to fight against the 
Japanese...When he was arrested because he said the truth to the 
people; the people organized a demonstration around the prison. 
Then, the government had to free him. Yet, our people have not freed 
for twenty two years even a single person who had been arrested 
because of his/her struggle for the people.”   
 
In the same vein, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet dated February 9, 1906 wrote that the 
revolutions were provoked by cruelty and autocratic character of the old regime and 
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led by philosophers and writers190. Thus, as it can be seen the Russian intelligentsia 
and the mass support that it received from the people were among the core issues of 
the Ottoman revolutionary journals regarding the Russian revolution of 1905. Yet, 
since the subject Ottoman journals were circulated in Europe illegally among the 
Ottoman intellectuals and middle class. The bulk of the people, peasants, were not 
reached by these journals. In fact, most of them were illiterate; and no intensive 
activity of forming an organization to make them conscious of the current situation 
was realized by the Ottoman intelligentsia.  
2.2.6 The Muzhik and the Ottoman Revolutionary Press 
 Although the peasantry in the Russian revolution of 1905 was not very 
effective in comparison with the workers- if we exclude the post-revolutionary 
peasant uprisings-; rather the workers who were the key elements in 1905 with their 
organized or spontaneous strikes and who attracted the scholarly attention of the 
west, the Ottoman press emphasized mostly the role that the Russian peasants played 
in the revolution of 1905. As it has already been said, the reason for that are the 
demographic features of the Ottoman empire in which peasants formed the bulk of 
the population and the lack of a working class. Therefore, the Ottoman intellectuals 
who published the opposition journals in Europe and in Egypt directed their agitation 
towards the peasantry.  
Many articles appeared in the Ottoman revolutionary press regarding the 
history of the Russian peasants, their position, and their role in the Russian 
revolution of 1905. To illustrate, İctihad dated May 1905 published an article on the 
rural history of Russia with an emphasis on the institution of zemskii sobor191. These 
were informative articles for the Ottoman public. In addition to these, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet 
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wrote extensively about the situation of the provinces and the peasants in the article 
entitled “War and Revolution”. The article mentioned the plunders of manors of 
landlords by the peasants with examples of Kursk where peasants, according to the 
journal, killed nine landowners and plundered their manors. The article also told that 
the cities including Moscow and Nizhni- Novgrad were threatened by the peasants 
and the dwellers of these cities asked for more security. Moreover, the journal 
continued192: 
“In Russia, peasants are in a fine fuss because of the autocracy, cruelty 
and misadministration of local officials. Among the ten or fifteen million 
peasant families, only one-third can get their necessities to survive. 
Others, who are hungry and naked, have to go to the cities in order to 
earn their livings… 
….these hungry peasants look like mines and torpedo which are ready to 
fire with a little contact as it is the case now with real mines and torpedo 
on the coast of Port Arthur. These peasant masses are to be the 
ammunition of the revolutionaries to blow up the autocracy”.  
 
As it can be seen, the journal well understood the topic and the point that how 
easy to spread revolutionary ideas upon the peasant masses who came to the city to 
work in factories as many scholars would agree. Another point, that the revolutionary 
press connected with the peasantry is the fact that the peasantry were also the army in 
both Russian and Ottoman empires. Thus, both are connected, at some point, if you 
are able to agitate peasantry, you may also agitate the army since, as Şûrâ-yı Ümmet 
says, “…Against that the Tsar defends himself with his armed forces, which in fact 
the most dangerous action to carry out in such a case. He can several times use armed 
forces against the people. However, the soldiers, who are a part of them cannot fight 
against his sons, father, brothers for a long time”193.  
While mentioning the events that were going on in the Russian empire, the 
journal Türk also gave a special importance to the peasants, but not as much as Şûrâ-
                                                 
192 “Muharebe ve İhtilâl”, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, no. 72, April 6, 1905. 
193 Ibid. 
 65 
yı Ümmet and İctihad. Türk published the letters of Gorkii and Tolstoy regarding the 
situation of the peasants in Russia. To illustrate, Gorkii said in his letter appeared in a 
Russian newspaper and copied by Türk that those who considered peasants as only 
rural dwellers were wrong in their thought. They knew what was going on in Russia 
as much as a civil servant in Petersburg194. Moreover, in another article written by 
Tolstoy for an English newspaper and again copied by Türk, the peasantry was 
considered to be the most important reason of the revolutionary situation in 
Russia195. 
The article entitled “On the Russian Revolution” and published in Şûrâ-yı 
Ümmet provided the reader with information about the Russian peasantry from the 
oldest times and argued that they had lived in small communities with an 
administrative form that had been close to the system of republic; and continued with 
the argument that the peasants then were enslaved and the system of bureaucracy 
strengthened and cemented the process of slavery196. Although, the same article 
accepted that the industrial workers were more open than the peasants for new ideas; 
a revolution to be successful was, the article argued, supported by the peasants and 
by the army197.  And the Russian intelligentsia, to some extent, succeeded in 
obtaining the support of the peasants, especially in European Russia, as Türk said, 
“the muzhiks, who regarded the Tsar as the little son of God, now are shaking his 
throne”198.  
2.2.7 Muslims of Russia and the Ottoman Revolutionary Press 
One of the major topics of the Ottoman Revolutionary press during the 
Russian revolution of 1905 was the situation and future of the Russian Muslims. 
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Several long articles were devoted by each journal to the Muslims of the Russian 
empire, whose population reached, according to the journals, 30-40 million. The 
main idea of whole series of articles appeared on the pages of Türk, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet 
and İctihad was that the Muslims must have taken an active role in the revolution and 
support the cause of the revolutionaries if they wanted to gain their civic freedoms 
and then, possibly political freedom. Developments in the Caucasus and in 
Azerbaijan particularly were reported regularly with an emphasis of the importance 
and effectiveness of the Muslim population of the Russian empire or how their effect 
and role in the subject disorders should have been formulated and improved199. On 
March 1905, İctihad published an article entitled “Muslims of Russia are 
awakening”, which stated that the Muslims, especially from the Volga-Ural region 
participated in the revolutionary activities actively and began to gain a 
consciousness, which would lead them to their freedom200. 
In addition to İctihad, an article under the title of “To the Muslims of Russia” 
appeared on the first page of Türk on October 13, 1905. This article proposed to the 
Muslims of Russia that they should have participated actively in politics political 
struggles and established a Muslim Party. According to the same article written by 
Turgud, the Muslims must have been conscious of their position in Russia and used 
this position to gain everything that they could have201. Moreover, the author Uğur in 
his column “I have seen” wrote that the Muslims would have indeed been happy that 
the Muslims of Russia had been granted civic freedoms; and that if the Muslims of 
Russia had insisted to remain static, they would have completely assimilated by the 
others under these conditions202.  
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Thus, as can be seen, the Muslims of Russia were given special importance 
by the Ottoman revolutionary journals. They were encouraged to take active part in 
party struggles in the Duma and to establish their own parties to strengthen their 
newly won civic freedoms and to pave the way for autonomy or even political 
freedom. Indeed, the Ottoman revolutionary journals were read by the Muslims of 
Russia, especially their ties and communication with Azerbaijan and Crimea were 
very strong, which Sultan Abdülhamid II feared. The same Muslims of Russia would 
play an enormous role in the forthcoming Young Turk revolution in Turkey. 
2.2.8  “The Great Russian Revolution and its Future” 
Interestingly, the ukaz of August 6 in which the Tsar granted a consultative 
assembly and very restricted election principles to the Russian people was considered 
as a great victory of the revolutionaries in the Ottoman revolutionary press. Türk 
gave the news of freedom of the Russian on its first page on August 17, 1905. The 
column entitled “Political” written by Özbek said203: 
“Do great results and awards stem from great struggles and 
difficulties? Russia has had enough struggles and difficulties both 
within the empire and outside of the empire. In spite of all 
difficulties, the Russians are writing a glorious history: August 
12204. As of August 12, the Russians are a member of the European 
family. On August 12 (birthday of his son, Alexei), the Tsar 
granted an assembly to the Russians. Although, the decree does not 
grant everything that the zemstvos and people wanted, with new 
arrangements, this can slowly and gradually look like the system of 
European governments.” 
 
However, as the Ottoman revolutionary press was confused about what was 
going on in the Russian empire and what did the ukaz mean; the Russian people, 
according to the Ottoman journals, were confused. A joke published by Türk  
showed the Russian ideas of the August election system and Duma205: 
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“This conversation between a man that had the right to be elected 
and his wife took place: 
-‘What is konstitutsia?’ Asked wife. 
-‘Wife of Grand Duke Konstantin’ answered his husband.” 
 
Another revolutionary Ottoman journal, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, on the other hand, 
did not consider the ukaz of August 6 as an ultimate triumph of the revolutionaries 
and wrote nothing important about this ukaz. Yet, for Türk and İctihad, it was a great 
lap. Türk wrote that an assembly was to be summoned by the Decree of August 6206 
with an election law that was so restricted; however, the assembly itself would 
continue to affect the Russian people207. Fortunately, the real difference between 
granting civic rights made itself clear with the publication of the October Manifesto. 
Türk published on November 9 gave a long column for the Manifesto and published 
a full text of it in the same column208: 
“Now, all subjects of the Russian empire were granted freedom. 
Namely, they wanted and they have got their freedom…If one 
cannot sacrifice, then he cannot get something desired…These 
Russians carried their lives at their hands and shed their blood for 
freedom…Two days before, a general amnesty was announced. The 
Russian history had a great revolution.”  
 
As it can be anticipated, the October Manifesto was regarded as a great 
achievement by the Ottoman revolutionary press. However, as Şûrâ-yı Ümmet wrote, 
the revolution was still failed to reach an end in a proper way209. Yet, the disorders 
and uprisings including peasants, workers and soldiers were growing and spreading. 
Then, what would be the future of the Russian revolution according to the Ottoman 
revolutionary press? As early as August 3, the journal Türk  announced that this time 
rather then the people, the Tsar wanted to carry out reforms, yet now the people 
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desired to put an end to the autocracy210. For the Ottoman revolutionaries, the 
Russians would, in a short while, be member of the free nations211.  
Another article written by Konuralp in Türk considered the Russian 
revolution of 1905 and the Manifesto of October as the beginning of the path that 
would take Russia close to the civilized and free nations of Europe. The same article 
also presented notable and literal comments of the future of the Tsar’s dynasty212: 
“…Keeping his nation under an autocratic rule with the help of his 
army, the Tsar entrusted his throne to Trepov the bloodthirsty and 
wanted to increase his pressure over the people by these measures 
when he realized that something had gone wrong in the empire. The 
Tsar anticipated that these measures would suppress the disorders and 
the will of freedom among the people…Although the Tsar was able 
to sign an agreement with Japan, he failed to sign an agreement with 
his own people…Such a freedom that was obtained as the Russians 
did cannot be taken back easily. It is known that constitution is not 
granted but taken... Fearing the spread of the uprisings and disorders, 
the Tsar had to grant a constitution and an assembly to the 
people…Journals, which had been under the strict censorship in a few 
months ago, are now shaking the authorities of censorship. The 
government following this will satisfy people and the Tsar will see 
how meaningless of the autocratic law given by God. If Romanovs do 
not lose their throne at that time, they may understand that their Great 
Father is still supporting them…” 
 
Furthermore, the journal Feryad’s editorial written by Mustafa Ragıp on May 
31, 1906 said, “now the internal situation of Russia can be said to be tranquilized to 
some extent; yet the real revolution in Russia can began after that”213. The same 
journal even asked if the parliament composed of people’s representatives would 
forgive the former oppressors or exercise a jurisdiction over them214. Türk pushed it 
too far to claim, “The Russian revolution proved to be greater than the French 
revolution…Russia from now on will not satisfy with a constitutional monarchy and 
will be the first to declare a republic among the European states…The Russian 
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people have fully realized what they want is not constitutional monarchy, but a 
republic”215.  In the forthcoming issue, an article entitled “Future of the Russian 
Revolution” claimed that the Russian revolution did not only mean a Russian, but 
also showed its impact on a geography ranging from the Adriatic coasts to China and 
that this was not only an economic revolt stemming from internal reasons. The article 
also said that when the Russian revolution freed itself from foreign impact, it would 
turned out to be an Islamic revolution216.  
As it can be seen the Russian revolution of 1905 was considered to pave the 
way for greater changes in the structure of the Russian empire. Yet, the Ottoman 
revolutionaries failed to understand and see or preferred not to understand and see 
that a counter-revolution, which would pacify the country in a relatively short time 
compared with the revolution, was already on its way in the Russian empire. Only an 
article in Şûrâ-yı Ümmet written by S. Sezai mentioned a possibility of a failure 
regarding the Russian revolution and stated the weak points of the Russian 
revolutionaries217. In this article appeared in the editorial column on the first page, it 
was said that revolutions did not come into existence suddenly and a general uprising 
was prepared in long period. However, the article also argued that in spite of being 
prepared in a long time period, a revolution should have taken place and seized the 
power in a very short time218: 
“If it does not, then it means that the revolution has not adequately 
prepared yet. To illustrate, the French revolution took place in a few 
days following the Bastille incident…There are two ways for the 
revolutions prepared in a long time one is to succeed in a short time 
and the other is to perish in a long time. The reason why the Russian 
revolution has not yet succeeded in its ultimate goals is that the 
revolution has not occurred in a spontaneous and unorganized way. 
Moreover, the revolutionary party is too fragmented ideologically.”  
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Although, the author of the article was able to catch very interesting and 
meaningful points with regard to the Russian revolution of 1905, he at the end of the 
article again tried to ensure the reader that the Russian revolution would be 
successful in spite of a short postponement since the people sacrificed themselves for 
it and he continued that there was no power that could alter the course of the 
revolution to end with no results219. Moreover, İctihad claimed on June 1906 that at 
that time the power of the supporters of the autocracy and of freedom were equal and 
that opening of a parliament meant that the freedom was there220.  
Since a constitutional revolution in one of the strongholds of the autocratic 
rule in Europe was a great dynamic for the Ottoman revolutionary movement; the 
period of counter-revolution from above and its success was ignored by the Ottoman 
revolutionary press and the Russian revolution of 1905 was depicted as a great 
achievement of the oppressed Russian people led by intellectuals. These were in fact 
the desired future developments for the Ottoman opposition groups. Therefore, they 
imposed a censorship of their own and ignored the success of the counter-revolution 
in the Russian empire in a directly opposite way from the censorship imposed by the 
Palace that banned the news on the Russian revolution in İstanbul.  
2.2.9 The Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Ottoman Empire 
The Russian revolution’s evaluation by the Ottoman revolutionary press with 
regard to the Ottoman empire should be taken into account under two mainstream 
arguments. One of them is that the journals considered the Russian revolution of 
1905 as an example to the Ottomans and a successful revolution against the 
autocratic rule of a ruler against which they also fought in their country. The second 
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is that the revolution and the subsequent formation of Duma were evaluated by the 
opposition press in a way that through these steps, the Russia empire entered into the 
path of free nations and thus development, which would leave the Ottoman empire as 
the only autocratic power in Europe that according to them would deteriorate the 
position of the Ottoman empire in international arena, so the Ottoman empire must 
have kept up with the Russian empire.  
In the eyes of the Ottoman revolutionaries, two remaining autocracies in 
Europe were the Russian and the Ottoman empires. Although the European power 
insisted on imposition of reforms in the Ottoman empire, the Sultan showed Russia 
as an example of them and considered it as a guarantee of his own rule in the 
Ottoman empire, the Ottoman opposition groups thought. In fact, the memoirs of a 
contemporary intellectual, Ali Haydar Mithat221 confirms this view. According to 
him, to illustrate, the progressive movement and air created by Tanzimat reforms 
alarmed the Russian empire, which thought that the sick man would recover from the 
illness of backwardness222. Moreover, he claims that the Russians sent General 
Ignatiev in order to be an obstacle to the progressive reforms of the Ottomans. 
Interestingly, this was the same Ignatiev, who tried to hinder Mithat Paşa’s Vilayet 
Law, which envisaged an improvement in local administration, by saying to the 
Sultan that the subject law would undermine his rule in the provinces as we have 
mentioned above223. Another interesting example that Ali Haydar Mithat gives 
regarding the Russian and Hamidian alliance is re-appointment of Mahmut Nedim 
Pasha who was a Russophile and the Tsar’s advises to the Abdülhamid II sent 
through an official of the Sultan. According to this, Tsar Nicholas II advised Sultan 
Abdülhamid II that a) the constitution should have been eliminated completely; b) 
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the Sultan should have been autocratic; c) dynasty’s revenge should have been taken 
from those who included in the killing of Sultan Abdülaziz224. Thus, in line with the 
Ottoman intellectuals of opposition an unnamed agreement was there between the 
Tsar, who aimed at preventing the progressive dynamics of the Ottomans and the 
Sultan, who aimed at protecting his status as absolutists.  
Regarding this point, an opposition newspaper, İctihad, wrote that 
Abdülhamid II said, “If the people try to take action against me, they will find 
Russian battleships on Beşiktaş coast and Cossack whips on themselves”225, which 
was considered as a high treason of Abdülhamid II to his own country. In the same 
column, a revolution in the Russian empire, due to these reasons, was said to be 
welcomed by the Ottoman people as if the revolution had occurred in the Ottoman 
empire. In addition to this, the journal stated, “the future of Russia is of vital 
importance for Turkey, because Russia is sponsor and protector of not only Turkey’s 
but also whole world’s autocratic rulers”226.  
Moreover, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet made comparisons of the events in the Russian 
empire in terms of the Ottoman traditions and past. Mentioning the Tsar’s assembly 
convened before the ukaz of February 18 in which the Tsar consulted his ministers 
and the Holy Synod regarding the reforms and the Minister of Justice argued that the 
autocrat did not have the right to restrict autocracy in the Russian empire, the journal 
said that even though we still had the constitution of 1876, our minister could not 
dare to say such a thing to the Sultan, which showed the limits of autocracy in both 
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countries227. Indeed, the main point that the journal ignored here is the European 
culture of the Russian elite. It continued228: 
“Ottomans! Learn a lesson from these. You had never been enslaved. 
You have always been free. But, today you seem much more 
enslaved than Russian muzhiks. Ideologies and thoughts do not make 
any impact on you. No one among you rebels. You should know that 
continuation of life requires freedom. Because of your inactivity, 
other nations of the world consider us as a death nation; and small 
and great, all nations are waiting to take a share from our country."  
 
  
In its March 21 issue, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet again made a comment regarding what 
should have been in the Ottoman empire in an article written mainly about the 
“Bloody Sunday”. The journal pointed out, after briefing what Gapon said following 
the “Bloody Sunday”, that these words must have been said by a Muslim religious 
man in our lands since our religion required this as a must229. Türk also often 
stressed the importance of the Russian revolution as an example for the Ottomans, 
“Now, we know who waits for us and see where we go! In this sense, it is important 
for us to know which path the Russians followed”230.  On May 31, 1906 Feryad 
said, “those absolutists who do not know or do not want to know how sacred is 
people’s will as God says, should learn a lesson from the Russian revolution”231. In 
the same article, which appeared as editorial, the journal said by taking a lesson 
from the Russian revolution that nations, which did not install their freedom by their 
blood, were bound to lose it in a short time as the Ottoman people had done in 
1877232. Türk wrote on November 16, 1905233: 
 “We should awaken by seeing the events in Russia. If history is read 
it can be seen that such revolutions occurring in one country show 
their effects on the neighboring countries. It is our country which is 
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close to Russia and in need of freedom. History of Russia in the last 
year should be an example for us. If we do not know how a nation 
forces its rulers to grant civic freedoms, we should learn. Otherwise, 
this situation has already began to take us to the edge of a 
chasm…Let’s show a sign of life…Nation should now take control of 
this.” 
 
As it has been said above, the other reason why the Russian revolution 
stressed so much in the Ottoman revolutionary press with regard to the position of 
the Ottoman empire is that the revolutionaries thought that when the Russians 
obtained their freedom, the only autocratic state in Europe would be the Ottoman 
empire, which would place the empire in a difficult position in the international 
arena. To illustrate, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet argued that the real threat for the Ottoman 
empire would not come from Russia, but from our autocratic rule, if the revolution 
succeeded in Russia and that in order to secure ourselves from such a situation, we 
should have first to look at our internal affairs and tried to catch a progressive path 
to follow234. As Türk stressed235: 
“A new Russia out of today’s disorders and uprisings may emerge. 
Then, Russia may become a real world power, which should be an 
example for the Ottomans. Even the Chinese have decided to 
summon a parliament within 10 years and sent students to be 
educated in Japan. If Russia is granted a constitution, then there 
will remain no country governed by old regime except for us 
between Asia and Europe. We rejected the reform proposals from 
Europe by showing Russia as an example of autocracy. Now, we 
will have no excuse. We have written and will continue to write on 
Russia as an example. We do not want the same bloody events to 
be experienced in out country, but we want our people to learn 
lessons from these examples…How can we remain incurious while 
a revolution is on its way in Russia? If we do not take Russia as an 
example, it is very likely that we will experience the same 
disasters?”  
 
Again in Türk, a letter sent by Turgud stated that the national interests of the 
Ottoman empire was against establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Russia, 
which would strengthen the Russian empire in international arena; yet, declaration 
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of a constitutional rule should have been supported from a humanly point since it 
meant freedom of 140 million of people236. Thus, regarding this point, a 
constitutional monarchy was regarded as a threat also to the existence of the 
Ottoman empire, which had been protected by the great European powers from the 
Russian pressure. But, what would be if Russia became a constitutional monarchy. 
Then, as the revolutionary opposition feared, the Ottoman empire might have been 
left to the Russians unprotected. It is in fact, true to some extent, if we consider the 
one of the reasons of the 1908 military led-revolt in Rumeli in the Ottoman empire; 
that was to prevent further foreign intervention including the British and Russian 
regarding the implementation of reforms in the Ottoman empire under the patronage 
of these states.  
Hence, the Ottoman revolutionary press wrote; analyzed; and interpreted the 
Russian revolution of 1905 in every single aspect since it provided their readers and 
themselves with a very dynamic example of a constitutional revolution in the 
strongest autocracy of the World. News on the Russian revolution of 1905 often 
appeared on the first pages of these journals, mainly as editorials, which showed the 
importance of news on Russia at that time. As it has been said, peasants, 
intellectuals, and the Muslims of the Russian empire were the main focuses of the 
Ottoman revolutionary press with regard to the revolution. To a great extent, these 
journals were the most important sources that the Ottoman intellectuals within the 
Ottoman empire learnt about and followed the course of the revolution of 1905. 
Although there are certain ideological differences among the publishers of the 
journals used in this study, it is obvious that on the Russian revolution of 1905, all 
of these journal more or less said the same things, made similar comments and 
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comparisons with their own revolutionary experiences regarding the Ottoman 
empire, which shows the possible lines of merger among these revolutionary groups, 
in fact. The subject merger took place just before the revolution of 1908, partly on 
the bases of their lessons that they derived from the Russian and then Iranian 
constitutional revolutions in which deep divisions among the revolutionaries harmed 
the course of revolutions. Therefore, as one can easily sees, the revolution of 1905 
was regarded as a valuable experiment of people and example for the Ottoman 
intellectuals in the Ottoman revolutionary press. 
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CHAPTER III 
3. THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905 IN OTTOMAN IMPERIAL 
CORRESPONDENCE  
After examining the repercussions of the Russian Revolution of 1905 in the 
Ottoman revolutionary press, perception of the other side of the struggle regarding 
the same event should be taken into account. The other side, namely the Ottoman 
imperial government, was informed about the revolution of 1905 by its embassy in 
Russia, informants and through Russian and European press. Although no news with 
regard to the concept of revolution in general and the Russian revolution of 1905 in 
particular were allowed to appear in the Ottoman press, even a relatively very small 
detail on the revolution of 1905 was immediately reported to the Palace. Moreover, 
news and columns that appeared in the foreign newspapers were translated by the 
Chambers of Translation and were forwarded to the palace.  
Indeed, one can easily perceive that every piece of news about the revolution 
in the Russian empire was of great importance for Abdülhamid II, who would 
experience a revolution for the same ends that would result in his dethronement 
from the power and put and end to the practical use of power by the Ottoman 
dynasty and undermine it to the theoretical means. In fact, Abdülhamid II proved to 
be effective in taking precautions to suppress the revolutionary tendencies among 
his subjects by drawing lessons from the same tendencies taking place in Russia and 
Iran at that time. News and courses of the events that brought about constitutional 
monarchies were regularly reported to the Palace. Thus, the same dynamics in the 
Ottoman empire were tried to be silenced and pacified. In the same vein, an 
important part of the imperial strata, i.e. the army, that had not been so active in the 
Russian and Iranian revolutions might have been ignored by the Ottoman Palace by 
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looking at the dynamics of the constitutional revolutions in the Russian empire and 
in Iran. In the Ottoman empire, however, the army would launch the armed uprising 
and the harshest struggle against the rule of Abdülhamid II. Actually, Abdülhamid II 
was known to have feared that the revolutionary ideas might spread to the Ottoman 
army237, yet, the role of army in Russia in 1905 and in Iran in 1906, which was still 
largely loyal, might have misled him. In fact, it was the role of the army that brought 
about the most successful constitutional revolution in 1908 among the three multi-
ethnic traditional empires.  
However, as we are going to see below, the palace was well-informed about 
the all revolutionary activities in the Russian empire in 1905 and its aftermath 
through various sources including Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg, informants 
and European newspapers and journals. Information obtained from these sources 
was prohibited to be announced to the public since Abdülhamid II feared that his 
subject would be inflicted by the revolutionary virus that affected the neighboring 
countries and shook the foundations of their absolutist regimes. Since there was no 
antidote effective for such a virus at that time, Abdülhamid II tried to prevent his 
empire by isolating it from the rest of the world in quarantine.  
The imperial structure in which reports regarding the Russian revolution of 
1905 were processed and perceived was a sophisticated one that had both ossified 
and crystallized during the reign of Abdülhamid II. During the Tanzimat years, the 
state had already been institutionalized with ministries and a bureaucratic 
structure238. As it has been mentioned above, following the first years of his 
ascension to the throne, Abdülhamid II succeeded in de-politicizing the Sublime 
Porte bureaucracy and transferred Yıldız Palace into the center of administration. 
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Thus, as Somel says, a separate bureaucratic body in Yıldız Palace emerged with the 
sole principle of loyalty to the Sultan239. Moreover, Abdülhamid II established a 
patrimonial palace structure consisting of people from different origins having 
certain connections with various segments of the society in his 33-year reign240. 
Thus, with the help of this structure, loyalty to the Sultan in the Palace and among 
the various segments that the subject patrimonial bureaucracy had ties; and a 
permanent flow of information to the Palace were provided.  
Abdülhamid II was also successful in establishing informal ties with various 
agents and informants from the high-raking officials, even among the heirs to the 
throne in the Ottoman dynasty, to the ordinary people in the Ottoman society. 
Therefore, as it can be seen, the Court system was created in detail and produced 
efficient results for 33 years. The patrimonial structure was the main source of 
loyalty to the Sultan in the Palace; and the loyalty of various segments of the 
Ottoman society to the individuals that had been included in this patrimonial system 
brought the loyalty of these subjects to the Sultan. Furthermore, the informants kept 
the Palace aware of the events ongoing within the Sublime Porte and among the 
people in advance, which resulted in both an effective control mechanism for the  
Sultan and a tension among the internal dynamics and institutions of the empire.    
Since we have already analyzed the period proceeding the revolution and the 
course of events of the revolution of 1905 both in line with secondary hand English, 
Russian and Turkish sources and within the Ottoman revolutionary press; in 
evaluating the contents of these documents, specifically the last months of the 
revolution of 1905 and the first month of the year 1906, namely the beginning and 
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the development of the counter-revolutionary era, are going to be discussed and 
analyzed below.  
3.1.How Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg viewed the Revolution of 1905  
Obviously, the basic, the most accurate and the first-hand source in accordance 
with the Palace with regard to the Russian revolution of 1905 was to be obtained 
from the Ottoman embassy officials in St. Petersburg. The information from this 
center was forwarded to the Palace in form of reports to the Sultan; and these reports 
were written by the Ambassador himself or by other high-ranking personnel of the 
embassy. Moreover, if Sultan needed, further information and details were requested 
from these embassy officials. To illustrate, Abdülhamid II asked for further details 
of Plehve’s assassination from St. Petersburg Ambassador Hüsnü Paşa in order to 
take necessary precautions to protect himself from such an attempt241.   
The sources that the Ambassador and the other embassy officials used in their 
reports to the Palace regarding the daily or weekly developments in Russia in 1905 
and its aftermath might be the official announcements of the Russian government, 
Russian newspapers and journals that were circulated in the capital of Russia, 
revolutionary pamphlets and means of propaganda. Moreover, individual agents in 
big cities of the Russian empire might be another source for these reports. 
Whatever, the sources were, the reports were full of details. Even the smallest-
scale event, which occurred in a relatively unimportant city, was reported to the 
Sultan in these reports in a way that showed the course of events and how it 
emerged and developed. When mentioning an event, the city names, district names, 
casualties and deaths from each side were inevitable parts of the subject reports 
prepared by the Embassy. Furthermore, these reports, apparently, paid a great 
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attention to the personal names and importance and role of these names in each 
event reported. 
Language used in these reports is also another point that should be emphasized. 
The revolutionaries were explicitly regarded as the other side and assassins of the 
high-ranking Russian governmental officials and were described with adjectives like 
“câni and kâtil” (murderer). Moreover, revolutionary groups were labeled with 
rather insulting words for the Ottomans like “anarşist” (anarchist). On the other 
hand, the Russian government officials were always respected in these reports. The 
name of the Tsar, to illustrate, was always used with the adjective “hazretleri” 
(sacred). Therefore, it can be said that these documents demonstrate narrative of a 
constitutional revolution and its aftermath from an absolutist perspective day by day 
including important events, names, dates, places and figures. 
As it has been explained above, the reports forwarded by the Ottoman 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg and by Military Attaché and other officials of the 
Embassy are stored in the Yıldız Perakende Elçilik, Şehbenderlik ve Ateşemiliterlik 
catalog. Ottoman Ambassador in St. Petersburg had very important and parlous 
duties since the Russian empire was one of the key elements in Ottoman foreign 
policy and in international balance of power. Thus, relations and ways of 
communications with the Russian officials were of great importance for the 
Ottoman Ambassador in St. Petersburg. During the Russian revolution of 1905 and 
its aftermath, Hüsnü Paşa was the Ottoman Ambassador. During his term of office, 
he proved to be sincerely loyal to the Sultan and he reported the events taking place 
in the Russian empire during and after the revolution of 1905 in detail and as 
regularly as possible.  
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The first news of iğtişâşat (disorders) as harbinger of the further disorders 
began to appear in the reports of the Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg to the 
Palace on July 24, 1904242. The report also stressed that an assassination by the 
anarchists was planned to kill the Tsar243. The news of the “Bloody Sunday” and the 
following uprisings and disorders were forwarded to the Palace by the Ambassador 
Hüsnü Paşa on January 28, 1905244. The subject report said that the Russian 
government fired upon the rebellious workers, who first had gone on strike and 
demanded various concessions from the government245. The report also included the 
anti-tsarist and anti-governmental demonstrations, strikes and uprisings following 
the subject event in the Russian empire246. Moreover, the report provided 
information regarding the international reactions and condemnations, especially 
those of France247 with regard to the mentioned event occurred in St. Petersburg and 
later to be known as “Bloody Sunday”. On April 20, 1905, the report dispatched by 
the Embassy mentioned the envisaged reforms and precautions to be implemented 
by the government in order to pacify the increasing tension among the people248. 
According to the subject report, the reasons of the discontent and disorders would be 
examined and necessary reforms to satisfy people would be applied249.   
On July 7, 1905, Hüsnü Paşa, in his report to the Palace, told a series of events 
regarding the mutiny of the battleship of Knyaz Potyomkin250. The report gave a 
historical background regarding the mutiny and its development, then, the 
precautions taken by the Russian government to capture the mutiny and its aftermath 
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were given in detail with names of the mutineers and officers. At that time the 
mutineers had already been surrendered to the Rumanian authorities at Costanza, 
yet, as it can be understood from the document, Hüsnü Paşa tried to attract attention 
to the precautions taken by the Russian government and then how the government 
acted in order to stop the mutiny before it grew to the unwanted extents251.  
On December 12, 1905, the report forwarded by the Ottoman Embassy in St. 
Petersburg indicated that the Russian government began to take necessary 
precautions to prevent revolutionary disorders throughout the empire and announced 
the penalties to be implemented in case of a disorder or uprising.252 Yet, as it can be 
seen in the report, although these precautions showed certain impact over the 
people, some groups including workers of the postal services and a military 
regiment in Moscow continued their uprising and a rebellion was planned in the 
Baltic provinces to separate the subject provinces from the Russian empire253. 
Moreover, the report informed that nine newspaper proprietors were arrested and 
their newspapers were closed down by the government officials254, which was a 
very common act of the Ottoman government at that time as we have already said. 
Meanwhile, the report sent on July 28, 1906 mentioned dispersion of the Duma; 
appointment of Stolypin to the post of Prime Minister after the resignation of the 
previous one; and the precautions taken so as to secure the order in the capital city, 
St. Petersburg255. 
Another report sent by Hüsnü Paşa on September 24, 1906 stressed that military 
courts were established to exercise jurisdiction upon the revolutionists who tried to 
                                                 
251 Ibid. 
252 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA, 48/47.  
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid. 
255 BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA. 49/54. 
 85 
assassin or killed a military or government official256. According to this document, 
the military courts undertook this responsibility in order to pacify further 
revolutionary activities. Moreover, in the report it was told the Embassy was doing 
and would continue to do its best to protect the citizens of the Ottoman Empire in 
Russia.257 
After that time, when we proceed to the year 1907, it can be seen that the format 
of the reports including the hand-writing changed. Moreover, length and details 
given in the report increased. In addition to that, the reports started to indicate the 
sources from which information presented was received. To illustrate, in a report 
dated January 1, 1907 and forwarded to the Palace in the name of the Ottoman 
Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Hüsnü Paşa, it was said, “in accordance with the 
newspaper Rus, a demonstration with participation of hundreds of people in the 
above-mentioned region and upon the warning of soldiers the demonstrators were 
dispersed…”258. Furthermore, in the same report, it was told that a new agreement or 
a modification in some articles of the Treaty of Portsmouth were being negotiated 
between the Japanese and the Russian governments; and this information was said to 
have been written by European newspapers for a while259. In addition to these, now, 
domestic and international policies of the Russian empire began to be dealt with in 
the reports apart from the revolutionary activities and governmental precautions 
against them. For example, Stolypin was claimed to resign from the post of Minister 
of Interior and only retain his premiership260, which was not true, in fact. 
Following that date, frequency of the reports forwarded from the Ottoman 
Embassy in St. Petersburg increased.  To illustrate, four reports were sent to the 
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Palace between March 18 and April 8, 1907; and six reports between May 16 and 
June 11, 1907. Now, the focus of the reports became the Russian Duma, its 
activities, political parties involved in the elections and their political orientations. 
The reports forwarded on March 18, 21 and on April 2, 8 provided information 
regarding the discussion taking place in the Russian Duma on the abolition of the 
martial law in the empire and budgetary and agricultural issues261. In addition to 
these, the documents mentioned the disorders and uprising going on, specifically in 
Moscow and political assassinations, which generally targeted the members of the 
Duma262. According to the reports, various groups of workers often went on strike 
and government tried to take precautions against them263.  
 Reports dispatched from the St. Petersburg Embassy of the Ottoman empire 
on May 16, 21, 22 and June 1, 5, 11, 1907 provided information with regard to the 
revolutionary disorders that were still going on in the Russian empire and the 
government’s proposed and applied precautions in order to suppress such disorders 
and movements264. The reports also mentioned the parliamentary politics and 
political parties and zemstvo activities265, which had already been transformed into a 
tsarist character at that time. As mentioned, since Abdülhamid II was very interested 
in the assassinations and assassination attempts in foreign countries, in spite of the 
fact that such news were forbidden to be published in the Ottoman press in İstanbul; 
in order to take necessary precautions to protect himself from such attempts; the 
assassination of Grand Duke Constantine was given in these reports266. In the two 
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reports dated September 3 and 23, 1907267; the St. Petersburg Embassy of the 
Ottoman empire the disorders and uprisings seemingly suppressed and more space 
was given to the political developments occurring in the Russian empire. To 
illustrate, the documents mentioned the zemstvo meeting in Moscow and its 
outcomes and the issues that had been discussed in the Duma during the subject 
months268.  
 The reports that were dispatched from the Embassy on October 8, 29 and 
November 2, 5, 1907 stated that the revolutionary committee which had led the 
uprisings of soldiers in Kronstadt and in St. Petersburg were judged by the Military 
court of St. Petersburg and were sentenced with various penalties269. Moreover, the 
same reports indicated that political assassinations in the Russian empire continued, 
while the government seemingly tightened the measures in order to handle the 
revolutionary tendencies. In addition to these, the underground revolutionary 
organizations and governmental struggle against them was mentioned with an 
example in central Russia270. This shows that the once free organizations that had 
openly carried out their activities in the “days of freedom” following the October 
Manifesto, now, became again illegal and underground organizations. The election 
results and the composition of the Duma, in the document, were given attention with 
the ideas of each group represented (ibid.). Actually, in another report forwarded on 
December 31, 1907; January 5, 18, 1908; by the Military Attaché Mustafa Enver of 
the Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg, the subject revolutionary organizations 
would be examined in detail in terms of their leadership, organizations, aims and 
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activities271; while an extensive information would be provided regarding the 
domestic situation of the Russian empire.  
 The report forwarded on October 17, 24 and 31, 1907, which mentioned the 
revolutionary activities throughout the empire and results of the elections272; the 
above given report regarding the revolutionary organizations273 and the following 
report sent on February 3, 1908 to the Palace were written by the above-mentioned 
Military Attaché instead of the Ambassador. The Military Attaché provided 
information regarding the revolution in the Russian empire and the situation of the 
Russian army and the Duma politics 274.  
 Then, the last report from the Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg in the 
catalog, which covers the reign of Abdülhamid II, as mentioned above, was 
dispatched by the Ambassador Hüsnü Paşa on April 13, 1908275. It mentioned the 
activities of the Duma and travel of Montenegrin Prince to St. Petersburg276. 
Interestingly, the subject report that was sent on April 13, 1907 still talked about a 
revolution in the Russian empire. As it can be seen, although the Russian 
government had already taken decisive measures to suppress the all revolutionary 
elements, at least to silence them, and to a great extent became successful; the 
reports forwarded from the Ottoman Embassy give the impression that there was 
still a revolution in mid-1906 and in 1907. Indeed, there were revolutionary groups 
and they continued to carry out certain activities; it was not the case of a revolution 
in mid-1906 and in 1907. The counter-revolutionary attack of the Tsar and 
government proved to be successful at that time when the Fundamental Laws that 
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restricted and undermined the meaning of the constitutional system had already been 
issued before the opening of the First Duma.  
3.2. Chambers of Translation and the Russian Revolution of 1905 
 The main duty of the Chambers of Translation in the Ottoman Empire during 
the reign of Abdülhamid II was to translate news and other documents related with 
the Ottoman empire or that the imperial government was interested in. These news 
and documents might be written in any language other than Turkish and were 
translated into Turkish. The subject documents, in the Ottoman Archives, are stored 
under the catalog name of Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiyye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği attached to 
Yıldız Perakende Evrakı. In fact, the subject catalog also includes the documents 
that are in a foreign language and not translated. Since the Russian empire and its 
situation had a great importance for the Ottoman Sultan and statesmen, important 
news appeared in the European or Russian press regarding domestic and 
international situation of the Russian empire were immediately translated by the 
interpreters served in the Offices of Translation. The documents related with the 
Russian revolution of 1905 that can be reached in the archives are mostly the 
translations of European and Russian newspapers and journals.  
 A document dated July 7, 1905 contained translation of various parts of the 
newspaper Die Zeit regarding the battleship of Potyomkin, which, according to the 
translation, surrendered277. The subject translation was made by Veli, whose name 
often appears under the documents related with Russia. News translated in this 
document was long and included a detailed history of Potyomkin issue with the 
possible penalties to be implemented for mutineers. According to the document, the 
Tsar was not expected to forgive even a few mutineers symbolically and the 
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mutineers would probably be executed278. The document did not only mention the 
Potyomkin issue, but also the scarcity of food throughout the empire and its possible 
effect over the growing revolutionary tendencies279. Moreover, the disorders in the 
St. Petersburg regiment and reasons of this were examined in the subject document.  
 However, the Potyomkin mutiny was not over for the Ottoman empire, as we 
can understand from another document dated July 21, 1905, according to which 
Potyomkin mutiny deeply alarmed the Ottoman empire280. The document translated 
by Veli from Lokale Anzeiger newspaper dated July 18, 1905 said, “First the Greek 
war and then the movement of the Russian Black Sea fleet had not had little impact 
on the Ottoman Minister of Navy; yet this time the Potyomkin issue wakened the 
Minister from his deep sleep and the threat that the Russian fleet in the Black Sea 
posed has been perceived well…”281. The document also stated the break-down of 
the Ottoman navy and its current strength282. Another document dated February 9, 
1906 contained translations of summaries from European press regarding the 
ongoing events in the Russian empire283.  Indeed, the offices did not solely translate 
newspapers, but also official documents of foreign countries. To illustrate, the 
archival document dated February 23, 1906 was a translation of the Tsar’s decree to 
notables regarding the attempts to secure the order throughout the empire284. In the 
same vein, the Tsar’s proclamation regarding the Duma was directly translated in 
the document dated June 18, 1907285. The subject documents also included the 
reasons of the dispersion of the Duma and results of the elections held286.  
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 Another document dated June 8, 1906 is a translation of various news from a 
Brussels newspaper Independence Belsh287. It mentioned extensively on the agrarian 
uprisings in the Russian empire and new developments in St. Petersburg regarding 
the inspection of revolutionaries and their organizations. To illustrate, police had 
discovered dynamites and revolutionary materials in Zabalkanskii Square in St. 
Petersburg288. The documents also provided information regarding how agrarian 
protests and uprising took place and how the government and soldiers reacted289. In 
this example, the soldiers fired on the peasants and five of the rebellious peasants 
died and many wounded290.  
 The documents included in this catalog are direct translations and do not 
have any personal comments. They are generally short and the expressions used for 
the Ottoman empire in the European press might be softened. However, they are 
indeed another good source of information for the Ottoman government regarding 
the Russian revolution of 1905. If these documents are read with the others, they can 
provide an overall picture of the world in that year with a special focus on the 
Ottoman empire, its neighbors and its relations with the great powers of that age. 
When compared with the Yıldız Perakende Elçilik, Şehbenderlik ve Ateşemiliterlik 
catalog, the Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiyye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği put an end to the 
revolutionary activities in the Russian empire at the end of the year 1906. It means 
that the European and Russian press and officials documents did put an end to the 
Russian revolution of 1905 at the end of that year since they constituted the basic 
sources of the subject catalog. 
 
                                                 
287 BOA, Y.PRK.TKM. 50/14. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
 92 
3.3. The Russian Revolution of 1905 in Ottoman Military Documents 
The documents included in the catalog entitled Askeri Maruzat of Yıldız 
Perakende are, in terms of the Russian revolution of 1905, related with the 
Potyomkin issue and border issues. The first document mentioning a disorder in the 
Russian empire dates March 15, 1905291. In fact, the focus of the subject document 
was the border violation done by the Armenians, who took advantage of the 
disorders in the Russian empire292. On July 7, 1905, it was said that the Potyomkin 
battleship began to follow a route towards İstanbul293 and certain precautions were 
said to have been taken. As can be understood, Potyomkin issue was watched 
closely by the Ottoman military since there was not enough defense force on the 
Bosphorus at that time and the existing ones should have been strengthened, as 
Abdülhamid II would do294. Another document from Mabeyn Başkitabeti catalog295 
also displayed the importance of the Potyomkin issue. It alarmed the government 
that the Potyomkin battleship was moving towards İstanbul and precautions 
including placing torpedo in the Sea were to be taken in accordance with this296. 
One can learn specific details from these documents. To illustrate, in a document 
dated July 1, 1905297; the Russian Ambassador in İstanbul, Zinovyev, was said to 
depart for the Black Sea in order to inspect an event that Russian revolutionaries 
captured a Belgian ship in the Black Sea. 
 Meanwhile, an interesting document reached to the Palace on August 20, 
1905. The document warned the government that some people from the rebellious 
crew of the battleship of Knyaz Potyomkin came to İstanbul with Rumanian 
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passports298.  The document suggested that since these people had the possibility of 
being anarchists; the government should have taken the necessary and compulsory 
precautions299. The district that these people settled in İstanbul and other details 
were also provided in the document300. Thus, as it can be seen, the military 
documents covered the issues related with the security of the Ottoman empire and 
protection of its citizens. 
3.4. The Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Office of the Grand Vizier 
 Most of the documents in Yıldız Archives regarding the Russian revolution 
1905 are classified within the sub-group of Yıldız Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı, 
which contains documents forwarded to the Sultan by the Grand Vizier regarding 
especially foreign affairs and developments in foreign countries that might have an 
impact on the Ottoman empire. The system generally worked in a way that 
ministries and embassies dispatched informative letters and translation of foreign 
documents to the office of the Grand Vizier, who forwarded the important ones to 
the Sultan with a notification. The subject catalog, thus, includes a great amount of 
documents sent by various sources to the Grand Vizier. These documents are in 
forms of translations, direct information, newspaper summaries and inquiries 
regarding any specific issue related with the foreign affairs, especially.  
 The documents related with the Russian revolution of 1905 began to be 
forwarded to the Sultan from various sources at the end of 1905. To illustrate, a 
document dated October 29, 1905 stated that disorders and uprisings spread to all 
parts of the Russian empire301. Indeed, it was the hardest time of the revolution 
following the October Manifesto for the Russian government. Then, seemingly 
                                                 
298 BOA, Y.PRK.ASK. 232/20. 
299 Ibid. 
300 Ibid. 
301 BOA, Y.A.HUS. 494/495. 
 94 
Ottoman officials began to worry about the citizens of the Ottoman empire in 
Russian and searched for the ways through which the citizens of the Ottoman 
empire would be brought back302. In fact, there emerges a contradiction here with 
what scholars claimed with regard to Abdülhamid II and the attitude of the Ottoman 
government towards the Ottoman citizens in Russia. Although, many scholars claim 
that Abdülhamid II was so afraid of a spread of revolutionary ideas that he even did 
not let the pilgrims going to Mecca from the Russian empire during the time of 
revolution; the document shows that he did care about the Ottoman citizens, who 
might be affected by the revolutionary virus, in the Russian empire and tried to save 
them from the chaotic situation in Russia.  
The subject catalog also includes many documents, which contain translation 
and summaries of the foreign press on the revolution in the Russian empire. To 
illustrate, a set of summaries with regard to the same topic was submitted to the 
Sultan on March 25 and March 26, 1905303. The latter document gave the 
summaries of the newspapers of Novoe Vremya and Novosti of Russia. Again, a 
document dated January 28, 1906 provided summaries of news regarding the 
revolutionary uprisings and activities in the Russian empire in European press304. 
Such documents, which had the same format and included news from the European 
and Russian and even local Russian newspapers305, were forwarded to the Sultan on 
April 1, 1905306; March 29, 1906307; April 8, 1906308; April 29, 1906309; May 9, 
1906310; May 19, 1906311; May 30, 1906312; June 4, 1906313; July 15, 1906314; July 
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22, 1906315; August 26, 1906316; August 31, 1906317; September 30, 1906318; 
October 11, 1906319; October 19, 1906320; and on December 17, 1906321. 
Apart from these newspaper summaries, other documents including embassy 
reports and official announcements of the Russian empire helped the Palace to shape 
the events going on in the Russian empire during the revolutionary era. The news of 
the October Manifesto and the envisaged establishment of the Duma with legislative 
rights in the Russian empire were submitted to the Sultan, who regarded Russian 
autocracy as a basic support for his own, on November 10, 1905 from the 
summaries of Russian newspapers of Novoye Vremya and Novosti322. Documents 
regarding the disorders following the October revolution were regularly sent to the 
Sultan by the Grand Vizier. Opening of the first state Duma by the Tsar was told in 
a document dated May 13, 1906323. The same document also provided details 
regarding the State Council that was designed to counterweigh the Duma in the 
legislative of the Russian empire and its rights324. Another document dispatched 
from the office of the Grand Vizier to the Sultan on January 4, 1906 indicated the 
grave situation in the Russian empire with detailed narratives of the uprisings 
occurring in various parts of the empire and the impacts of these uprisings on the 
Russian government325. Following documents from the same office to the Sultan 
with regard to the revolution mostly mentioned disorders (iğtişâşat); internal 
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situation of the Russian empire326 and sometimes specific uprising in a part of the 
empire, specifically the uprising in Moscow327 or reasons of the current disorders in 
the empire328.  
 However, as it was the case in the Ottoman documents forwarded to the 
Palace from the Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg, the revolution, disorders and 
uprisings did not end in the Russian empire in line with the documents dispatched 
from the office of the Grand Vizier. Documents that gave information with regard to 
the internal situation of Russia, disorders, and uprisings continued to be sent to the 
Sultan. To illustrate, a document dated July 18, 1906 still mentioned the seriousness 
of the internal situation in the Russian empire and that the grave events, which 
shook the foundations of the empire, did continue for years329. Moreover, another 
document forwarded on August 8, 1906 said that the Ottoman Embassy in St. 
Petersburg would be protected by the Russian officials against the threat of an attack 
by the revolutionists and anarchists330. Moreover, a document dated October 1, 1906 
included the full text of an ukaz published by the Tsar on August 19, 1906 regarding 
the envisaged reforms on the freedom of thought, individual; improvement of the 
workers’ situation and application of insurance by the government; reforms 
regarding the Duma, zemstvos; improvement of the rights of the peasants was sent 
to the Sultan331. 
Thus, as it can be seen, the Palace watched the chain of events that brought 
about a state assembly with legislative rights and a constitution to the Russian 
Empire closely from various sources, which provided the Palace with different 
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perspectives. The news prohibited to be published in the Ottoman realm were 
circulated in the hidden mechanism of the Yıldız Government under Sultan 
Abdülhamid II and the subject mechanism was aware of the smallest details 
regarding the revolutionary upheavals in the Russian empire on which the non-
intelligent Ottoman reader did only know rumors and stories that were sometimes 
exaggerated or undermined. 
3.5. An Exemplary Agreement signed between the Ottoman and Russian 
Empires regarding Revolutionists and Anarchists 
In the last year of Abdülhamid II’s reign, an agreement was signed between 
the Ottoman Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Interior and the Russian Embassy 
in İstanbul on April 6, 1908 for co-operation in inspection, arrest and sending back 
the revolutionists and anarchists between the Ottoman and the Russian empires332. 
The text of the agreement and a summary of the provisions included in the subject 
agreement were submitted to the Sultan for approval by the Ottoman Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and of Interior.   
 One of the interesting points of the agreement is that it was signed with two 
Ottoman Ministers and the Russian Embassy in İstanbul, which seems a bit strange 
in terms of diplomatic procedures. Moreover, the time of the agreement shows that 
the agreement would produce nothing since the revolution of 1905 in the Russian 
empire had already been ended and counter-measures applied by the Tsar had 
proved to be successful. Furthermore, the Ottoman constitutionalists, who would 
seize the power with a military uprising in the same year of the agreement, did not 
carry out activities in the Russian empire, which they criticized much due to its 
autocratic character.  
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 The agreement envisaged that a special commission composed of officials 
from the Ministries of Interior of the Russian and Ottoman empires was to be 
established with a preliminary duty of exchanging information regarding the 
activities of revolutionists and anarchists with each other. Secondly, news and 
activities against Sultan Abdülhamid II and Tsar Nicholas II were to be prevented 
and special commissions of both empires were to take action and inform each other 
in such cases. Thirdly, revolutionists and anarchists, who might attempt 
assassination of the Sultan and the Tsar or plan activities with dynamites and other 
terrorist means of struggle, were to arrested and sent back to his/her country. 
Moreover, the military units on the mutual borders of both empires were to prevent 
border violations by revolutionist groups from both sides and to arrest them before 
informing each other. The military units were also to take necessary precautions for 
this. The special commissions to be established were to exchange information 
without concealing333.  
 As known, the agreement is short-lived as Abdülhamid II would leave the 
power in the Ottoman empire to the Young Turks and to the Parliament that would 
be opened with a constitution in 1908. Thus, Abdülhamid II failed to see a 
revolution with full force was at the door when the subject agreement with his 
approval was signed between his Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior and the 
Russian Embassy in İstanbul. 
 As can be seen, the Ottoman archives regarding the Russian revolution of 
1905 contain a lot of documents, which may help a reader understand the chain of 
events occurred in the Russian empire from 1905 to 1907 and even to 1908 from the 
perspective of the Ottoman government. As said before, the documents, as a whole, 
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is a narrative of a constitutional revolution from an absolutist point of view. 
Abdülhamid II, who was claimed to consider the Russian empire as a protector of 
his own despotism in the Ottoman empire, must have alarmed when he read these 
documents coming from various sources in 1905, 1906 and 1907. Yet, he 
unexpectedly, may be, fell into the trap of constitutionalists while the Russian 
imperial government had already recovered from the subject virus. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The Russian Revolution of 1905 occurred in a spontenous and unorganized 
way that resulted in a constitutional regime with certain deficiencies. The revotion 
was a turning point in terms of showing that the people of autocratic regimes began 
to ask their rights from their rulers and to awaken, which, in fact, was the real virus 
disguised in the concept of revolution for the rulers at that time. The Russian empire, 
however, succeeeded in supressing the upheavals and movements that had shaken the 
foundations of the empire once; and recovered from the virus for a while.  
Indeed, it was impossible in 1905 to remain unaffected from the 
constitutional movements in multi-ethnic traditional empires of Eurasia, especially if 
it happened in one of the strongest hold of the autocracy. Thus, the Ottoman empire, 
both as a neighbor and as a traditional empire, watched the Russian revolution of 
1905 closely. There were two opposing body, each of which considered and 
interpreted the events of 1905 in a different way. Namely, they were the Ottoman 
revolutionaries, who extensively used press as a means of struggle and of spreading 
their constitutional ideas against the Hamidian rule at home; and the Ottoman 
government under Abdülhamid II, who transformed the Yıldız Palace in the heart of 
administration by devitalizing the bureaucracy and ulema in the administrative 
structure.  
The revolution of 1905, therefore, was a blow to the rule of Abdülhamid II of 
the Ottoman empire since such an experience would be a leading example for his 
own subjects. On the other hand, what Abdülhamid II feared was realized by the 
Ottoman revolutionary groups of the Young Turks, who as Abdülhamid II thought, 
used the Russian revolution of 1905 as an example and considered it as a cornerstone 
of their own struggle against rule of istibdâd of Abdülhamid II. Although 
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Abdülhamid II had already taken precautions and imposed a heavy censorship on 
press regarding news on anti-imperial and revolutionary activities in the Ottoman 
empire and in other countries. Thus, the Ottoman press in İstanbul and in other cities 
of the empire were not allowed to publish news or articles regarding the Russian 
revolution of 1905. In fact, Abdülhamid II’s rule and precautions proved to be 
effective that 33 years of reign can be considered its proof.  
Then, the Young Turks, who had their ideological roots in the Young 
Ottomans of the previous generation and who established a opposition movement 
against the rule of Abdülhamid II, especially in Europe, where the Sultan’s power 
was ineffective to prevent their activities. The Young Turks in Europe were either 
exiled or fled to Europe due to the oppressive regime of the Sultan. Gradually, they 
began to establish organizations and at the end the Committee of Union and Progress 
came into existence. Undoubtedly, during the beginning of the 20th century, the sole 
way to reach the Ottoman intellectuals and spread their ideas on constitutionalism 
was press. Thus, the Ottoman revolutionary groups were efficient in publishing 
journals in various cities of Europe and in Egypt. These journals always found a way 
to enter the Ottoman realm in spite of the regulations banning them and were read by 
the Ottoman intellectuals and middle class in the empire.  
As for the Young Turk journals, the revolution of 1905 in the Russian empire 
was a great event for the Ottoman revolutionaries since the revolutionary process 
showed and enlightened their way, in line with their arguments. The journals 
including Türk, Şûrâ-yı Ümmet, Feryad, Osmanlı and İctihad provided the reader 
with a detailed narrative of the Russian revolution of 1905 and with numerous 
articles devoted to the subject revolution. Most of the commentaries in the subject 
journals ended with sentences indicating that the Russian revolution must have been 
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an example both for the Young Turks and for the Ottoman Sultan if the Ottoman 
government did not want the same bloody events to happen in the Ottoman empire. 
As can be expected, the revolution of 1905 in Russia was depicted as if it had been a 
great revolution of world-scale and led the Russian people to be a part of the 
civilized European nations. Indeed, carrying out their activities and being educated in 
Europe; the Young Turks had a Euro-centric mind and way of thought and 
considered the European civilization as a great example to be followed.  
Interestingly, the role of peasantry and of the intellectuals were given great 
importance in the Ottoman revolutionary and the working class was, to some extent, 
ignored since there was no working class in the Ottoman empire; the main dynamic 
of a possible constitutional revolution in the Ottoman empire, in accordance with the 
Young Turks, would be the intellectuals, military and peasants. Moreover, if the 
journals published in mid-1906 and after are studied, it is seen that the journals still 
depicted the Russian revolution of 1905 as a great revolution and achievement of the 
people, although the counter-revolution carried out by the imperial government 
became successful in Russia. Understandably, the revolutionary and 
constitutionalists movements in the Russian empire were the desired future 
development for the Young Turks, thus, as said before, they imposed their own 
censorship and ignored the news pertaining to the successful counter-revolutionary 
measures of the Tsar.  
In addition to these, there are certain common characteristics that the subject 
Ottoman revolutionary journals had. First, although, these journals had a strict 
ideological perspective in line with their publishers in terms of being Ottomanists or 
Westernists, and the Russian revolution of 1905 was unique and a great example for 
them; they had sometimes different comments on the events of 1905 in Russia and its 
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possible effect in the Ottoman empire, as stressed in Chapter II. Secondly, since the 
main target of these journals was Abdülhamid II and his rule of istibdâd, 
commentaries and articles regarding the revolution of 1905 mostly ended with 
criticism of Abdülhamid II and warnings that such events would occur in the 
Ottoman empire if the Sultan continued to suppress people. Furthermore, these 
journals tried to agitate Ottoman reader by stressing how Russians revolted and 
gained their freedom from the Tsar and the same could be done in the Ottoman 
empire.  
The Ottoman government, on the other hand, received the news pertaining to 
the events going on in the Russian empire during the years of 1905-1906 from a 
variety of sources. Yet, these sources were mainly governmental reports of the 
Russian empire regarding the events; European and Russian newspapers and 
journals, most of which were conservative; and information obtained from the 
informants and others. Therefore, there was a difference between the Russian 
revolution of 1905 in the Ottoman revolutionary press and the Russian revolution of 
1905 in the Ottoman imperial documents in terms of its scope and ideological 
background and the support that it received from the people. In fact, the Russian 
revolution of 1905 in the Ottoman imperial documents was a narrative of a 
constitutional revolution from a conservative and administrative point of view.  
Ottoman imperial documents present a picture of the Russian revolution of 
1905 in, which is full of disorders, blood, assassinations, murders and upheavals, to 
the reader. Such a picture, indeed, was not only avoided by the Sultan, but also by 
ordinary people. On the other hand, the Russian revolution of 1905 in the Ottoman 
revolutionary press was a triumph of the oppressed people against their autocratic 
rulers. Disorders and upheavals were shown as people’s answer to the oppressive 
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regime of the Tsar; blood, assassinations and murders were the necessary price to be 
paid by the people in exchange for constitution and freedom for the journals.  
Although, a constitutional revolution in any country, especially in a neighbor 
country, was not a desired development for the Sultan and Ottoman government, the 
revolution of 1905 did not end in mid-1906 and in 1907 in the Ottoman imperial 
documents. Documents forwarded to the palace even at the end of 1906 and 
beginning of 1907 still mentioned a revolution (ihtilâl) in the Russian empire. Yet, 
the documents, in contrast to the Ottoman revolutionary press, paid attention to the 
counter-revolutionary measures imposed by the Tsar; and how these measures were 
carried out by the imperial government.  
Generally, the Palace was well-informed about the events and revolutionary 
activities in the Russian empire in 1905, 1906. The documents pertaining to the 
revolution of 1905, like the Young Turk journals, were full of details. The volume of 
the subject documents, openly, indicates the importance given by the palace on the 
revolution 1905 in Russia and its consequences.  
Thus, the Russian revolution of 1905 observed by the Ottomans closely, but 
evaluated in two different ways by two rival bodies. While the Ottoman Sultan and 
the government were alarmed with the chain of events, which later has been known 
as the revolution of 1905; the Ottoman revolutionary groups greeted the revolution in 
their journals and took it as a precious example of people’s power and their guide to 
a constitutional regime in the Ottoman empire.  
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